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RELIGIOUS LIBERTY INTEREST CONVERGENCE

ASMA T. UDDIN*
ABSTRACT
Americans are deeply polarized on a plethora of issues. One of the
most prominent areas of polarization is religious liberty, which in
recent years has increasingly pitted conservative, white Christians
against a range of marginalized minorities, particularly Muslims.
The divide threatens Muslims’ rights and the vitality of religious
liberty more broadly. This Article assesses the extent to which selfinterest—especially the self-interest of the conservative Justices of the
Supreme Court—can help depolarize religious liberty.
Professor Derrick Bell’s theory of “interest convergence” helps
connect different self-interests that, in turn, enable issue-specific
coalitions strong enough to effect serious cultural and legal change.
Bell used interest convergence theory to analyze judicial decisionmaking during the civil rights movement. Other scholars have built
upon Bell’s original thesis about Black people’s rights by extending
interest convergence to other racial minorities. This Article is the first
to consider the implications of interest convergence not just for
religious minorities but specifically the status of religious minorities
in today’s politicized religious liberty landscape. In so doing, it aims
to formulate a theory of “religious liberty interest convergence.”
Specifically, this Article applies Bell’s framework to two recent
Supreme Court cases. It uses interest convergence theory to explain
the rulings against Muslim claimants in Trump v. Hawaii (2018)
and for Muslim claimants in Tanzin v. Tanvir (2020).
* Asma T. Uddin is a visiting professor at the Catholic University of America Columbus
School of Law and a fellow with the Aspen Institute’s Religion & Society Program. She has
written two books on religion and politics, WHEN ISLAM IS NOT A RELIGION (2019) and THE
POLITICS OF VULNERABILITY (2021).

83

84

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:083

The Article concludes by assessing the relevance of religious liberty
interest convergence to political coalition-building. In both the
judicial and coalition-building contexts, relying on self-interest helps
create openings where openings may not otherwise be possible.
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INTRODUCTION
America is becoming increasingly polarized between conflicting
cultural and political perspectives. Americans’ partisan affiliations
are morphing into broad identities that even include factors like
what they eat and drive, where they live and shop, and their race or
sexual orientation. Unfortunately, this grouping has also affected
religious communities and religious liberty, so that white, conservative Christians (and their religious claims) are associated with the
Republican Party, and the claims of religious minorities (particularly Muslims) are associated with the Democratic Party. This
Article aims to identify potential convergence points for religious
liberty lawyers seeking to build bipartisan and cross-ideological
support for religious freedom, with specific attention to the MuslimChristian divide.
Professor Derrick Bell’s theory of “interest convergence” helps
connect different self-interests that, in turn, enable issue-specific
coalitions strong enough to effect serious cultural and legal change.
Bell used interest convergence theory to analyze judicial decisionmaking during the civil rights movement. Other scholars have built
upon Bell’s original thesis about Black people’s rights by extending
interest convergence to other racial minorities. This Article is the
first to consider the implications of interest convergence not just for
religious minorities but specifically the status of religious minorities
in today’s politicized religious liberty landscape. In so doing, it aims
to formulate a theory of “religious liberty interest convergence.”
Specifically, this Article applies Bell’s framework to two recent
Supreme Court cases. The Article uses interest convergence theory
to explain why the conservative Christian Justices1 of the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled against Muslim claimants in Trump v.
Hawaii2 but for Muslim claimants in Tanzin v. Tanvir.3 Both cases
positioned Muslims as national security threats and appealed to the
conservative Justices’ predilection for deference to the executive
1. Parts IV.A and B explore evidence that the conservative Justices of the Court reflect
the interests of conservative Christians broadly.
2. 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
3. 141 S. Ct. 486 (2020).
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branch—but they led to two very different results. In Hawaii, the
conservative Justices upheld the Trump administration’s executive
order blocking citizens from six majority-Muslim countries from
entering the United States (dubbed by many as the “Muslim ban”).4
The Court held that in matters of immigration and national
security, it must defer almost completely to the executive branch.5
In contrast, in Tanvir, the conservative Justices joined with their
liberal colleagues in holding for three Muslim men seeking money
damages against FBI agents who pressured the men to spy on their
Muslim communities.6 This result ensued even though a key part of
the government’s argument was that provision of money damages
would compromise national security.7
This Article proceeds in five Parts. Parts I and II provide the
requisite background and analytical framework. Part I lays out the
various facets of religious liberty polarization in the United States,
including key drivers of these divides. Part II breaks down the
primary battlefronts in the religious liberty culture war. Generally,
the war pits conservative, white Christians against a range of
marginalized minorities. The political and legal discourse, however,
is preoccupied with the more specific conflicts between Christians
and sexual minorities (addressed in Section A), and Christians and
Muslims (addressed in Section B). The conflict with sexual minorities is defined here as being centered on cases that involve Christians’ objections to contraception, abortion, and same-sex marriage.
The conflict with Muslims stems from conservative Christian
Justices’ perceived favoritism for Christian claimants over Muslim
ones.
Part III outlines Bell’s interest convergence theory and how other
scholars have used it to both explain rights-protective decisions at
the Supreme Court (addressed in Section A), and develop strategies
for political coalition-building (addressed in Section B). This Part
also describes Bell’s thinking about the limits of interest convergence in effectuating lasting change.

4.
5.
6.
7.

138 S. Ct. at 2423.
See id. at 2421-22.
141 S. Ct. at 488-89.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 28, Tanzin v. Tanvir, 141 S. Ct. 486 (2020) (No. 19-71).
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Part IV presents the central proposition of the Article. It offers
possible strategies for diffusing tension by applying Bell’s interest
convergence theory to religious liberty. This Part uses the theory to
explain the contrasting results in Hawaii and Tanvir. It assesses
both cases against the backdrop of the current politicized religious
liberty landscape and the conservative Justices’ apparent alignment
with the conservative faction of that culture war. Based on this
assessment, Part IV offers several areas of interest convergence
between the conservative Justices and the Muslim men in Tanvir
and then argues that many of those same interests were not at
stake in Hawaii. It also uses those convergence points to chart a
path forward for Muslim-Christian coalition-building on religious
liberty. Finally, this Part considers the unique features of the
religious liberty tradition that contribute to the viability of religious
liberty interest convergence vis-à-vis Bell’s pessimism about the
long-term success of racial interest convergence.
Part V concludes with an assessment of the project’s limitations.
It gives special attention to the strong ideological divergences between conservative Christians and Muslims in America.
I. POLARIZATION OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN THE
UNITED STATES: KEY DRIVERS
There are two key drivers of today’s religious liberty polarization,
particularly the polarization between Muslims and conservative
Christians. The first involves significant demographic changes that
have resulted in what one prominent pollster calls the “[e]nd of
[w]hite Christian America.”8 The second is the country’s growing
tribalization on not just policy positions but also a wide range of
other preferences.
A. End of White Christian America
Many white, conservative Christians (Protestants in particular)9
believe that the country is not just leaving them behind but also

8. ROBERT P. JONES, THE END OF WHITE CHRISTIAN AMERICA 50-51 (2016).
9. Id. at 40, 49-51.
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repudiating many of their core beliefs. Three shifts are contributing
to this sense of anxiety.
First, for the first time in U.S. history, white racial dominance in
terms of numerical representation is on the decline.10 In 1965, white
Americans constituted 84 percent of the U.S. population.11 Now,
they are projected to be a minority by 2055 according to Pew,12 or by
2044 according to the U.S. Census Bureau.13 Second, also for the
first time in U.S. history, white Protestant Christians are currently
a minority in America.14 A 2017 Public Religion Research Institute
(PRRI) study found that white Protestant Christians constitute only
43 percent of the U.S. population.15 In 1996, white Christians still
made up two-thirds of the population.16 Among white Protestants,
white Evangelicals have also seen a precipitous drop in their
number. In the 1990s, white Evangelicals constituted 27 percent of
the U.S. population; today the number is somewhere between 17
and 13 percent.17
Third, the demise of white Protestant America has brought with
it an end to Protestant dominance over American culture and institutions. Not only is Christianity declining, but so is religion
overall.18 More and more Americans are religiously unaffiliated (the
so-called “nones”).19 In 2019, the percentage of nones became
10. PEW RSCH. CTR., MODERN IMMIGRATION WAVE BRINGS 59 MILLION TO U.S., DRIVING
POPULATION GROWTH AND CHANGE THROUGH 2065: VIEWS OF IMMIGRATION’S IMPACT ON U.S.
SOCIETY MIXED 23-27 (2015).
11. Id. at 27.
12. Id. at 29.
13. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Projecting Majority-Minority (2014), https://www.census.gov/
content/dam/Census/newsroom/releases/2015/cb15-tps16_graphic.pdf [https://perma.cc/F6LRRL7X].
14. Jason Wilson, We’re at the End of White Christian America. What Will That Mean?,
THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 20, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/sep/20/
end-of-white-christian-america [https://perma.cc/4WQB-TBMV].
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Harriet Sherwood, “Toxic Christianity”: The Evangelicals Creating Champions for
Trump, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 21, 2018, 1:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/
oct/21/evangelical-christians-trump-liberty-university-jerry-falwell [https://perma.cc/M6SMRJ3V].
18. Samuel Smith, Religious “Nones” Now as Big as Evangelicals in the U.S., New Data
Shows, CHRISTIAN POST (Mar. 20, 2019), https://www.christianpost.com/news/religious-nonesnow-as-big-as-evangelicals-in-the-us-new-data-shows.html [https://perma.cc/NUX2-5SHE].
19. Id.
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roughly the same as the percentage of Evangelicals or Catholics.20
By 2016, the nones already constituted the nation’s largest “religious” voting bloc.21 The massive shift signals growing discontent
with organized religion generally. Altogether, this has precipitated
an identity crisis that has generated tremendous anger, insecurity,
and anxiety.
B. Tribalization of American Politics and Muslim-Christian
Relations
America is deeply polarized between competing cultural and
political viewpoints, and the divide is only getting worse. As political
scientist Lilliana Mason explains in Uncivil Agreement: How Politics
Became Our Identity, Americans’ political affiliations are morphing
into “mega-identit[ies].”22 A single vote now indicates more than a
person’s partisan preference; it also indicates his or her religion,
race, gender, and a host of preferences such as their favorite grocery
store.23 Partisanship is no longer a single social identity but rather
a “mega-identity, with all the psychological and behavioral magnifications that implies.”24 Given these dynamics, if one were to tell
someone over the phone that they were a Republican, the listener
could reasonably assume that the speaker was not Black, nonreligious, Jewish, or LGBTQ.25
The phenomenon can be seen in terms of the difference between
sorting and polarizing. The first is issue-based polarization—
Americans cluster together based on their policy opinions.26 The
second is identity-based polarization—Americans cluster together
20. Id.
21. Christopher Ingraham, The Non-Religious Are Now the Country’s Largest Religious
Voting Bloc, WASH. POST (July 14, 2016, 1:15PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
wonk/wp/2016/07/14/the-non-religious-are-now-the-countrys-largest-religious-voting-bloc/
[https://perma.cc/3LBZ-TQYP].
22. LILLIANA MASON, UNCIVIL AGREEMENT: HOW POLITICS BECAME OUR IDENTITY 14
(2018).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Peter Bacon Jr., Democrats Are Wrong About Republicans. Republicans Are Wrong
About Democrats., FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (June 26, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/
features/democrats-are-wrong-about-republicans-republicans-are-wrong-about-democrats/
[https://perma.cc/33HW-SXKW].
26. EZRA KLEIN, WHY WE’RE POLARIZED 32-33 (2020).
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based on political identities.27 Americans’ political identities are
polarizing their other identities, and issue conflicts are merely one
of many expressions of that hostility.28
In this ever-widening circle—what one journalist and political
commentator calls the “politicization of everything”—almost nothing
is apolitical anymore.29 Consider a 2004 ad by the Club for Growth,
a conservative group that advocates for lower taxes and deregulation, against then-presidential candidate Howard Dean.30 The ad
features someone asking an older white couple what they think of
Dean’s plan, and the man responds: “I think Howard Dean should
take his tax-hiking, government-expanding, latte-drinking, sushieating, Volvo-driving, New York Times-reading—.”31 His wife cuts
in: “Body-piercing, Hollywood-loving, left-wing freak show back to
Vermont, where it belongs.”32 Each of these traits reinforces a
particular mega-identity, and when one is activated, they are all
activated.
In an America where everything is political and where everything
fits into one or the other mega-identity, religion is no different. NonChristian religious minorities and Muslims, specifically, are facets
of the liberal mega-identity. Interfaith civic leader Eboo Patel
begins to get at this in Out of Many Faiths: Religious Diversity and
the American Promise, where he notes that Muslims are given
platforms by outlets like the New York Times, NPR, CNN, and the
New Yorker—outlets that are associated with a multicultural, progressive America and less so with a white, conservative America.33
If Trump’s America castigates Muslims, Barack Obama’s America
celebrates them.34 In a sense, then, Muslims have “become a totem
in the current chapter of the American culture wars,” and Americans’ embrace or rejection of Muslims signals a tribal belonging to
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Kevin Baker, The Politicization of Everything, POLITICO MAG. (Jan. 31, 2017), https://
www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/01/the-politicization-of-everything-214714/ [https://
perma.cc/8YRS-H387].
30. KLEIN, supra note 26, at 69.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. EBOO PATEL, OUT OF MANY FAITHS: RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY AND THE AMERICAN PROMISE
85-86 (2018).
34. Id. at 86.
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one or the other type of America.35 In other words, Muslims are
traits of the liberal mega-identity, and opposition to Muslims is a
trait of the conservative mega-identity. This leads Conservatives to
oppose Muslims as part of their opposition to liberals.
There is, of course, more to the anti-Muslim opposition than
Muslims’ presumed association with liberals. Part V looks at
empirical findings that Muslims are perceived not just as outsiders
but also as fundamental threats to American identity.36 Americans
also favor protecting religious liberty for Christians over other faith
groups, ranking Muslims as the least deserving of this right.37
At the core, though, is the mapping of the religious divide onto the
political divide. For example, it is mostly Republicans who believe
that Christians face more discrimination than Muslims, while most
Democrats believe that Muslims face more discrimination.38
The tribalization of American politics and Muslim-Christian
relations, and the demographic trends described above, together
form the backdrop of today’s battle over religious freedom. As Part
II explains, in this battle, conservative, white Christians are pitted
against marginalized minorities. That dynamic is also crucial to the
possibilities—and limits—of religious liberty interest convergence,
which this Article explores in Parts IV and V.
II. POLARIZATION OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN THE UNITED STATES:
CHRISTIAN CONSERVATIVES VERSUS MARGINALIZED MINORITIES
In Sherbert v. Verner, the U.S. Supreme Court held that when a
government measure places a “substantial infringement” on a
religious practice, the government has to offer a compelling interest
justifying the burden, and it must prove that its measure is the

35. Id. at 85-86.
36. PEW RSCH. CTR., U.S. MUSLIMS AND ISLAM GENERAL PUBLIC VIEWS CONCERNED ABOUT
THEIR PLACE IN SOCIETY, BUT CONTINUE TO BELIEVE IN THE AMERICAN DREAM 122-30 (2015).
37. See Rachel Zoll, AP-NORC Poll: Christian-Muslim Split on Religious Freedom, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec. 30, 2015), https://apnews.com/de486b3d64154d0baae9f04fba0a4094/ [https://
perma.cc/TK6V-XGW4].
38. See Neha Sahgal & Besheer Mohamed, In the U.S. and Western Europe, People Say
They Accept Muslims, but Opinions Are Divided on Islam, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Oct. 8, 2019),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/10/08/in-the-u-s-and-western-europe-people-saythey-accept-muslims-but-opinions-are-divided-on-islam/ [https://perma.cc/FYS2-RV4N].
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least restrictive means of serving the government’s interest39—a
standard known as “strict scrutiny.”40 In 1990, the Court watered
down that legal standard for Free Exercise Clause violations in
Employment Division v. Smith,41 provoking an outcry from religious
and public policy groups across the spectrum.42 These groups
worked together to pass the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA), which reinstituted the strict scrutiny standard in 1993.43
Today, the RFRA no longer enjoys the strong bipartisan support
it once did. Martin R. Castro, Chairman of the United States
Commission on Civil Rights, captured the shifting sentiment in the
Commission’s 2016 Peaceful Coexistence report: “The phrases
‘religious liberty’ and ‘religious freedom’ will ... remain code words
for discrimination, intolerance, racism, sexism, homophobia,
Islamophobia, Christian supremacy or any form of intolerance.”44
As has now become common even in mainstream legal and
political discourse, Castro argued that conservatives (often meant
to refer to white, Christian conservatives in particular) are using
religious liberty to “give one religion dominion over other religions,
or a veto power over the civil rights and civil liberties of others.”45 In
other words, the rights secured by conservative, white Christians in
some of today’s most prominent religious liberty cases directly
contravene the rights of marginalized minorities, including sexual
minorities, such as women and LGBTQ persons, and religious minorities, particularly Muslims.

39. 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963).
40. See, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 146 (1987)
(Powell, J., concurring) (referring to the analysis applied in Sherbert v. Verner as “strict
scrutiny”).
41. See 494 U.S. 872, 881-82 (1990) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause is generally
no bar to neutral, generally applicable laws).
42. Ross Douthat, When Politics Isn’t About Principle, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2021), https://
www.nytimes.com/2021/09/14/opinion/vaccine-politics.html [https://perma.cc/HEM7-F7ZP].
43. See generally Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488
(1993) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (2012)).
44. U.S. COMM’N ON C.R., PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE: RECONCILING NONDISCRIMINATION
PRINCIPLES WITH CIVIL LIBERTIES 29 (2016).
45. See id.
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A. Conservative Christians and Sexual Minorities
In recent years, perhaps no case has contributed more to the
politicization of religious liberty than the U.S. Supreme Court’s
2014 decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby.46 The owners of Hobby
Lobby craft stores, the Green family, objected to paying for two
drugs and two devices required under the Affordable Care Act
(ACA).47 In their view, providing these drugs and devices would
have violated their religious beliefs about abortion.48 The Court, in
a 5-4 decision split along ideological lines, held in favor of Hobby
Lobby.49 It held that because the government had found a way to get
these drugs to the employees of religious nonprofits that had similar
concerns, the government could provide that accommodation here,
too.50
The case was, in many ways, a straightforward application of the
law (in this case the Federal RFRA), which some prominent commentators acknowledged.51 Much of the public discourse, however,
painted the ruling as intrinsically political.52
This cultural divide was further exacerbated a year after Hobby
Lobby, when the Court established a constitutional right to samesex marriage in Obergefell v. Hodges.53 Christian conservatives who
think of marriage as a religious relationship refuse to facilitate
See 573 U.S. 682 (2014).
Id. at 702-03.
Id.
Id. at 687, 692.
Id. at 692.
See Emma Green, The Supreme Court Isn’t Waging a War on Women in Hobby Lobby,
ATLANTIC (June 30, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/06/hobby-lobbyisnt-waging-a-war-on-women/373717/ [https://perma.cc/E8D5-XPVS].
52. See Karen Finney, Hobby Lobby Opens a New Front in the “War on Women,” MSNBC
(July 13, 2014, 9:11 AM), https://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/hobby-lobby-opens-new-front-thewar-women-msna366701 [https://perma.cc/SK85-GQZR]; Sandra Fluke, Sandra Fluke: The
Hobby Lobby Case Is an Attack on Women, WASH. POST (June 30, 2014, 3:20 PM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2014/06/30/sandra-fluke-the-hobby-lobby-caseis-an-attack-on-women/ [https://perma.cc/US44-KF5K]; Peter Rosenstein, Hobby Lobby and
the War on Women, WASH. BLADE (July 3, 2014), https://www.washingtonblade.com/2014/07/
03/opinion-hobby-lobby-and-the-war-on-women/ [https://perma.cc/DST6-Y2GA]; Press Release,
Court Sides with Hobby Lobby, Joins War on Women, NAT’L ORG. FOR WOMEN (June 30, 2014)
(on file with author), https://now.org/media-center/press-release/court-sides-with-hobby-lobbyjoins-war-on-women/ [https://perma.cc/5SSN-A6L7].
53. 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604-05 (2015).
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
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same-sex weddings because doing so would violate their religious
beliefs.54 In the post-Obergefell landscape, the 2018 Supreme Court
case Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission became the most prominent of such challenges.55 That case
involved a Christian baker who refused on religious grounds to bake
a wedding cake for a gay couple.56
This strand of cases and the Hobby Lobby-type challenges have
splintered the once-bipartisan coalition in favor of the RFRA.57 Some
of the same advocates who supported the RFRA in 1993 are now
part of a coalition that is trying to enact the Do No Harm Act.58 The
purpose of the Act is to prevent the use of religious freedom to
“discriminate” against vulnerable populations.59
Most House Democrats today support the Do No Harm Act,60 and
all of them support another statute, the Equality Act, which would
eliminate RFRA claims in many civil rights cases.61 This rejection
of conservative religious claims as invalid is central to many
conservatives’ fear that religious liberty is under threat.62 Part IV
argues that this perception of threat creates an opportunity for
religious liberty interest convergence with marginalized religious
groups like Muslims.
B. Conservative Christians and American Muslims
Concurrent to the politicization of religious liberty with respect
to sexual minorities, the disparate treatment of religious minorities
has also come into sharper focus. The treatment of Muslims in

54. Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty and the Culture Wars, U. ILL. L. REV. 839, 849
(2014).
55. See 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
56. Id. at 1723.
57. Douthat, supra note 42.
58. See Do No Harm Act, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN (Oct. 8, 2021), https://www.hrc.org/
resources/do-no-harm-act [https://perma.cc/5E86-S9X5].
59. Id.
60. See generally Do No Harm: Examining the Misapplication of the “Religious Freedom
Restoration Act”: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Educ. & Lab., 116th Cong. (2019).
61. Danielle Kurtzleben, House Passes the Equality Act: Here’s What It Would Do, NAT’L
PUB. RADIO (Feb. 25, 2021, 4:39 PM), https://www.npr.org/2021/02/24/969591569/house-tovote-on-equality-act-heres-what-the-law-would-do [https://perma.cc/LS5K-7D5T].
62. See infra Part IV.
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particular is the subject of much recent discussion.63 This discussion
was prompted in significant part by the marked difference in how
the Court treated antireligious animus in Masterpiece versus
Trump v. Hawaii.64
In Masterpiece, the Court held in favor of the Christian baker,
basing its decision on the fact that several Colorado civil rights
commissioners had treated the baker’s religion with hostility.65
Three weeks later, however, the Court in a 5-4 decision (split along
ideological lines) upheld the Trump administration’s Executive
Order No. 13769.66 The order, or “Muslim ban,” blocked citizens
from six majority-Muslim countries from entering the United
States.67 In Hawaii, the Court declined to consider the extensive
evidence of President Trump’s anti-Muslim animus.68 It chose instead to defer to the executive branch because the issue implicated
matters of national security.69
In this context, executive deference required overlooking antiMuslim animus.70 For example, Trump had at one point declared,
“Islam hates us”71 and elaborated during an official presidential
debate that, “I mean a lot of them. I mean a lot of them.”72 His policy
proposals included “a total and complete shutdown of Muslims
entering the United States,” warrantless surveillance of American
Muslims, closing American mosques, and creating a registry of all
Muslims in the United States.73 Immediately after he was elected,
Trump put his words into action.74 In preparing for the travel ban,
63. See, e.g., supra Part I.B.
64. Compare Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723
(2018), with Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2415-23 (2018).
65. 138 S. Ct. at 1729.
66. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2402-03, 2423.
67. Id. at 2403, 2417.
68. Id. at 2421.
69. Id.
70. See id. at 2435-36 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 2436.
72. Donald Trump Says Stands by his “Islam Hates Us” Remark, ECON. TIMES (Mar. 11,
2016, 1:40 PM), https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/donaldtrump-says-stands-by-his-islam-hates-us-remark/articleshow/51356884.cms [https://perma.
cc/PE5L-G8GG].
73. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2435-36 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
74. See Rebecca Savransky, Giuliani: Trump Asked Me How to Do a Muslim Ban “Legally,” THE HILL (Jan. 29, 2017, 8:48 AM), https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/3167
26-giuliani-trump-asked-me-how-to-do-a-muslim-ban-legally [https://perma.cc/8NC3-MD6S].
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he summoned his advisor, Rudolph Giuliani, to “[p]ut a commission
together” to “show me the right way to do it legally.”75
However, the Hawaii Court found that these statements fell
outside the purview of the judicial branch.76 Led by Chief Justice
Roberts, the conservative majority (at the time, five Justices) stated
that regardless of the President’s intent, the executive order would
survive because it was “expressly premised on legitimate [national
security] purposes.”77 The Court could not “substitute [its] own
assessment for the Executive’s predictive judgments on such
matters, all of which ‘are delicate, complex, and involve large
elements of prophecy.’”78
Justice Sotomayor, in her passionate dissent, called out the
majority’s decision to “ignor[e] the facts, misconstru[e] our legal
precedent, and turn[ ] a blind eye to the pain and suffering the
Proclamation inflicts upon countless families and individuals, many
of whom are United States citizens.”79 Sotomayor reflected the
concerns of many Americans, who saw the travel ban decision as a
clear indication of disfavored treatment for Muslim minorities, in
stark contrast to the treatment of Christians.
Shortly after the Hawaii decision, in February 2019, Alabama
executed Dominique Ray, a Muslim death row inmate, without
accommodating his request to have an imam in the room with him.80
The clergy allowed in the execution chamber were limited to the
ones on staff, but the prison employed only Christian clergy.81 Ray
challenged the prison’s denial on religious liberty grounds and
asked that his execution be stayed while the matter was pending.82
When the matter reached the Supreme Court, the conservative
Justices permitted the State to proceed with the execution without
the imam.83 The decision shocked many Americans, leaving them

75. Id.
76. See 138 S. Ct. at 2417, 2420.
77. Id. at 2421.
78. Id. (quoting Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111
(1948)).
79. Id. at 2433 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
80. See Dunn v. Ray, 139 S. Ct. 661, 661 (2019).
81. Ray v. Comm’r, 915 F.3d 689, 697 (11th Cir. 2019).
82. Id. at 692.
83. Dunn, 139 S. Ct. at 661.
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wondering, in the words of the New York Times Editorial Board, “Is
Religious Freedom for Christians Only?”84
The public narrative of conservative Justices favoring Christian
claimants over Muslim ones has firmly taken root. Hawaii triggered
that piece of today’s polarized religious liberty conversation. The
ruling is also key in understanding the relevance of interest
convergence in effectuating rights-protective rulings for Muslim
minorities. This Article offers that analysis in Part IV. But first, the
next two Sections explore common ways Muslims’ religious freedom
is subordinated to other concerns of particular interest to conservative jurists. Part II.B.3. extends that analysis to the political sphere.
1. Deference to Executive Authority
The Court’s 5-4 split in Hawaii is another example of conservative, or Republican-appointed, judges’ deference to the executive
branch on matters of national security. Professor Cass Sunstein, in
his 2008 piece Judging National Security Post-9/11: An Empirical
Investigation, surveyed relevant court of appeal cases between
September 11, 2001, and September 2008 to determine the rate of
court invalidation of executive action.85 He also checked for ideological differences in the judges’ voting patterns.86 On the latter,
Sunstein found a significant difference in the voting patterns of
Republican-appointed versus Democrat-appointed judges.87 The
former invalidated national security measures in favor of individual
rights only 12 percent of the time.88 In contrast, the Democratic
invalidation rate was almost double that, at 23 percent.89 The invalidation rate also remained stable across cases in the seven-year
period, instead of spiking, in the immediate post-September 11
context, when judges might have felt the threat of terrorism more

84. Editorial Board, Is Religious Freedom for Christians Only?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/09/opinion/supreme-court-alabama-execution.html
[https://perma.cc/AGM4-V8SG].
85. See Cass R. Sunstein, Judging National Security Post-9/11: An Empirical
Investigation, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 269, 270-71.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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acutely.90 Sunstein compared cases in the three-year period
immediately post-September 11 with cases from 2006-2008 and
found no discernible difference in judges’ voting patterns.91
In an earlier piece, Sunstein considered what he called “National
Security Fundamentalism”—that is, the federal courts’ position in
the face of national security threats that the “president must be
permitted to do what needs to be done to protect the country.”92
Writing in 2005, just four years after September 11, Sunstein said
the U.S. Supreme Court was repudiating National Security
Fundamentalism in its decisions.93 However, the approach did make
a “conspicuous appearance” in a dissenting opinion by Justice
Thomas.94 In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, while the Court recognized the
power of the government to detain enemy combatants, a plurality of
the Justices held that when those detainees are U.S. citizens, they
have rights to due process.95 The Court reversed the lower court’s
dismissal of a habeas corpus petition brought on behalf of Yaser
Hamdi, a U.S. citizen who was being detained indefinitely as an
illegal enemy combatant.96
In his dissent, Justice Thomas repeatedly emphasized the
executive branch’s power to make determinations pertinent to
national security.97
I do not think that the Federal Government’s war powers can be
balanced away by this Court.... “It is ‘obvious and unarguable’
that no governmental interest is more compelling than the
security of the Nation.” The national security, after all, is the
primary responsibility and purpose of the Federal Government.... [B]ecause the Founders understood that they could not
foresee the myriad potential threats to national security that
might later arise, they chose to create a Federal Government

90. See id.
91. Id.
92. Cass R. Sunstein, National Security, Liberty, and the D.C. Circuit, 73 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 693, 693 (2005).
93. Id. at 694-95.
94. Id. at 695.
95. 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 579-99 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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that necessarily possesses sufficient power to handle any threat
to the security of the Nation.98

Justice Thomas went on to quote the Federalist Papers, stating that
the government’s power to protect the country “ought to exist
without limitation.... The circumstances that endanger the safety of
nations are infinite; and for this reason no constitutional shackles
can wisely be imposed on the power to which the care of it is
committed.”99
Justice Thomas’s position was that, because the executive branch
of the federal government has a strong interest in protecting
national security, it can use that interest to limit individual liberty.100 And the courts should not second-guess the executive
because judges lack “expertise and capacity,”101 and their interference “destroys the purpose of vesting primary responsibility in a
unitary Executive.”102
This position, Sunstein says, is National Security Fundamentalism.103 It cedes vast power to the executive branch with little to no
consideration of a particular case’s facts and context.104 That it was
Justice Thomas who embraced this position is relevant to the
discussion below on religious liberty interest convergence, as it was
Justice Thomas who wrote the opinion in the case under consideration in this Article, Tanzin v. Tanvir.105
Beyond the specific scenario of national security, conservative
Justices also defer to law enforcement. In 1971, the Supreme Court
in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents permitted federal lawsuits
against law enforcement officers who violate the Constitution.106 In
the years since, however, conservative judges and commentators

98. Id. at 579-80 (citations omitted) (quoting Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981)).
99. Id. at 580 (quoting FEDERALIST NO. 23, at 147 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed.,
1961)).
100. See id. at 580-82.
101. Id. at 579.
102. Sunstein, supra note 92, at 695.
103. Id.
104. See id.
105. See 141 S. Ct. 486, 489 (2020).
106. Stephen I. Vladeck, The Disingenuous Demise and Death of Bivens, 2019-2020 CATO
SUP. CT. REV. 263, 263.
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have insisted that Bivens was wrongly decided.107 The conservative
narrative is that Bivens was judicial arrogation of legislative power—and that Bivens’s recognition of implied causes of action is outdated.108 Justice Kennedy in the 2017 case Ziglar v. Abbasi, where
the Court refused to extend Bivens, described it as a relic of an “ancien regime.”109
Conservatives also worry what Bivens means for law enforcement’s ability to carry out their duties. A recent case, Hernandez v.
Mesa, reflects that concern.110 Hernandez involved a fifteen-year-old
Mexican boy who was playing at the U.S.-Mexico border when he
was shot by a Border Patrol Agent.111 The Fifth Circuit’s opinion in
the case notes that if law enforcement officers fear lawsuits for
possible constitutional violations, they may “hesitate in making
split-second decisions.”112 In the Hernandez context, the court said
that threat of litigation “could undermine the Border Patrol’s ability
to perform duties essential to national security.”113 Yet, as described
below, the Trump administration made the same arguments in
Tanvir—but lost handily.
2. Muslims as National Security Threats
As noted by Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in Hawaii, the travel ban
positioned Muslims as security threats.114 Data shows that more
than any other religious group, Muslims are viewed as security
threats and that stereotype affects judicial decision-making in
religious liberty litigation.115
Researchers Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise, and Andrew P.
Morriss conducted an empirical study of religious freedom cases in

107. Id.
108. Id. at 264.
109. 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1855 (2017).
110. See 885 F.3d 811 (5th Cir. 2018), aff’d, 140 S. Ct. 735 (2020).
111. Id. at 814.
112. Id. at 819.
113. Id.
114. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2440 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
115. See Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Muslims and Religious Liberty in the Era of
9/11: Empirical Evidence from the Federal Courts, 98 IOWA L. REV. 231, 235 n.17, 259, 282
(2012).
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federal district courts and federal appellate courts.116 They looked
at claims under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment,
the Free Speech Clause (for restrictions on religious speech), federal
statutes that specifically protect religious actions and speech, and
laws that protect against religious discrimination by the government, including government employers (they did not look at Title
VII cases of religious discrimination in private employment).117
Examining cases between 1986 and 1995, their study found that
religion exerted the most prominent and consistent influence on a
judge’s decision-making, whether it was the judge’s religion, the
claimant’s religion, or the religious demographics of the judge’s
community.118 A judge’s religious background determined how he or
she would rule.119 As for the claimant’s religion, the researchers
found evidence that Muslims, “apparently alone among the nonChristian religious faiths,” may face “greater resistance” to their
claims for religious accommodations.120
This initial evidence inspired Sisk and Heise to take a closer look
at just how disadvantaged Muslims are in court. Their second study
(“Sisk Study II”) looked at religious liberty cases (Muslim and
otherwise) decided between 1996 and 2005 and found that Muslim
claimants faced a marked disadvantage.121 Compared to nonMuslims, Muslims are nearly half as likely to win their religious
liberty case in federal court.122 The number shrinks further when it
is a Muslim prisoner bringing the case, with Muslim prisoners
succeeding only a third as often as non-Muslim prisoners.123 This
percentage is significant because prisoner cases comprise threefourths of all Muslim religious liberty claims.124 The only other
group with significant losses consisted of Black separatist sects.125
In trying to explain the reason for these skewed outcomes, Sisk
and Heise considered and dismissed several theories, settling on
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 235.
Id. at 237-38.
See id. at 238.
See id. at 238-43.
See id. at 249.
Id. at 248-54.
Id. at 249.
Id. at 276-77.
See id. at 260.
Id.
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their final explanation: Muslims are “at a pronounced disadvantage
... because they are Muslims.”126 The cases Sisk and Heise examined
involve a religious believer challenging some decision by the government—a decision that a public officer defends as necessary to American law and order.127 These types of cases trigger base stereotypes
among judges about Muslims or Islam as security threats.128
Although Sisk and Heise did not break down the court decisions
based on whether the judges were Democrat- or Republicanappointed, one can surmise based on Sunstein’s assessments as well
as the conservative posture on law enforcement and national security that conservative judges are more likely to rule against Muslim
claimants. One can also deduce this from the social and political
environment of conservatives broadly or certain judges, specifically.
For example, Justice Thomas’s wife, Virginia “Ginni” Thomas, is an
outspoken conservative whose activism has raised judicial issues in
the past.129 With respect to Muslims, she has invited hard-Rightanti-Muslim conspiracists to a meeting she convened at the Trump
White House,130 and she organized in support of the travel ban.131
3. Beyond the Courts: Religious Liberty Dissonance in Politics
The general posture in the political space can best be described as
religious liberty dissonance. Many of the most vocal defenders of
Christians’ religious liberty explicitly advocate against Muslims’
religious liberty. During the 2016 presidential election, where
presidential candidate Ted Cruz called the election the “religious
liberty election,” he stated that religious liberty issues were front

126. Id. at 262.
127. See id. at 236-37.
128. Id.
129. Jackie Calmes, Activism of Thomas’s Wife Could Raise Judicial Issues, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 8, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/09/us/politics/09thomas.html [https://perma.
cc/9QGP-PTST].
130. Maggie Haberman & Annie Karni, Trump Meets with Hard-Right Group Led by Ginni
Thomas, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/26/us/politics/trumpginni-thomas-meeting.html [https://perma.cc/WJ33-4AZV].
131. Betsy Swan, Leaked Emails Show Justice Clarence Thomas’s Wife Pushing Travel
Ban, DAILY BEAST (Apr. 11, 2017, 4:06 PM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/leaked-emailsshow-justice-clarence-thomass-wife-pushing-travel-ban [https://perma.cc/4QB3-4JEL].
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and center in determining who the next President would be.132 Thencandidate Trump also promised on the campaign trail that the first
priority of his administration would be to “preserve and protect our
religious liberty.”133 Yet, even as Cruz and Trump were rallying for
religious freedom, they were proposing staunchly anti-Muslim
measures.134 Trump promised to establish a database to track
Muslims and suggested shutting down mosques, and Cruz advocated for surveilling “Muslim neighborhoods.”135
On the local level, John Andrews, founder of the Western
Conservative Summit and a former Colorado Senate president,
proclaimed on the Summit stage, “The simplistic approach of simply
granting unconditional ‘freedom of religion’ to a religion that doesn’t
believe in freedom—and never doubt me, Islam does not—that
approach is civilizational suicide, friends.”136 Similarly, in a January
2018 press release, state senator of South Dakota, Neal Tapio, a
Republican running for a spot in the U.S. House of Representatives,
questioned whether the First Amendment applies to Muslims: “Does
our Constitution offer protections and rights to a person who believes in the full implementation of Islamic Law, as practiced by 14
Islamic countries and up to 350 [million] self-described Muslims,
who believe in the deadly political ideology that believes you should
be killed for leaving Islam?”137 In 2011, Jody Hice, the U.S. representative from Georgia’s Tenth District, argued: “Most people
132. Anugrah Kumar, Ted Cruz: 2016 Is Going to Be a “Religious Liberty Election,” CHRISPOST (Dec. 6, 2015), https://www.christianpost.com/news/ted-cruz-2016-presidentialelection-religious-liberty.html [https://perma.cc/G8L7-V784].
133. Charles C. Haynes, Trump and the Future of the First Amendment, FREEDOM F. INST.
(Mar. 3, 2016), https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/2016/03/03/trump-and-the-future-ofthe-first-amendment/ [https://perma.cc/4NE5-A76C].
134. See Katie Zezima & Adam Goldman, Ted Cruz Calls for Law Enforcement to “Patrol
and Secure” Muslim Neighborhoods, WASH. POST (Mar. 22, 2016, 7:47 PM), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/03/22/ted-cruz-calls-for-law-enforcement-topatrol-and-secure-muslim-neighborhoods/ [https://perma.cc/5LD6-L4SK].
135. Id.
136. Justin Wingerter, Nic Garcia & Anna Staver, Cory Gardner, the Women’s Vote and
Religion: Western Conservative Summit Takeaways, DENVER POST (July 14, 2019, 9:20 AM),
https://www.denverpost.com/2019/07/14/western-conservative-summit-trump-gardner/
[https://perma.cc/35AU-X9W7].
137. Seth Tupper, Tapio Questions Religious Freedom for Muslims, RAPID CITY J. (Aug. 12,
2019) (alteration in original), https://rapidcityjournal.com/news/local/tapio-questions-religiousfreedom-for-muslims/article_a4e4532f-1b69-5b4d-9400-a70fb5028caa.html [https://perma.cc/
4RFN-HV7C].
TIAN
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think Islam is a religion, it’s not. It’s a totalitarian way of life with
a religious component” further arguing that Islam would not qualify for First Amendment protection because it is a “geo-political
system.”138
The hypocrisy—or dissonance—also shows up in what prominent
voices choose not to say. When Republican presidential candidates
during the 2016 campaign repeatedly challenged Muslims’ religious
rights, conservative religious liberty groups stayed silent.139 The
Supreme Court’s contrasting results in Masterpiece versus Hawaii
were also met with silence.140 Many of the same conservative
religious groups that celebrated Phillips’s win in Masterpiece failed
to decry the travel ban decision or say anything at all about the
president’s anti-Muslim animus.141
In the forthcoming Sections, this Article maps out a path forward
for the depolarization of religious liberty. Part III explores Derrick
Bell’s interest convergence theory, which he used to analyze judicial
and political decision-making during the African American civil
rights movements. Section A of Part III also describes how other
scholars have used this theory to explain other rights-protective
decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court. Section B strategizes political
coalition-building between marginalized minorities and the powerful majority. Part IV applies interest convergence to the religious
liberty context, with a focus on the Christian-Muslim divide, and
uses the theory to explain the disparate results in Hawaii versus
Tanvir.
Importantly, the efficacy of interest convergence theory lies in the
fact that it does not require, in this context, for the powerful
138. Jane Timm, GOP Candidate Jody Hice in 2011: “Most People Think Islam Is a
Religion, It’s Not,” MSNBC (June 24, 2014, 8:21 AM), https://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/gop-jodyhice-islam-doesnt-deserve-first-amendment-protections-msna355796 [https://perma.cc/7K7DGAPV].
139. Michelle Boorstein, When Muslims Are the Target, Prominent Religious Freedom Advocates Largely Go Quiet, WASH. POST (Dec. 30, 2015, 1:45 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2015/12/10/when-muslims-are-the-target-prominent-religious-free
dom-advocates-largely-go-quiet/ [https://perma.cc/SH27-JJ7E].
140. Michelle Boorstein, Why Many Religious Liberty Groups Are Silent About the Supreme
Court’s Decision on Trump’s Travel Ban, WASH. POST (June 27, 2018, 10:58 AM), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2018/06/26/why-many-religious-liberty-groups-aresilent-on-the-supreme-courts-decision-to-uphold-trumps-travel-ban/ [https://perma.cc/N98F5AP2].
141. Id.
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majority to support Muslims’ religious freedom in a substantive
manner. Instead, the majority is primarily motivated by its own
self-interest—even as it continues to hold dissonant beliefs.
III. INTEREST CONVERGENCE THEORY
The development of civil rights for African Americans has not
been straightforward. As scholar Richard Delgado explains it,
progress has taken a “zigzag path, with periods of advancement
followed by ones of retrenchment.”142 Black people made great
strides during the Reconstruction, only to later face violence, terror,
and Jim Crow laws.143 Plessy v. Ferguson in 1896 consigned Black
people to inferior schools and public facilities in service of “separate
but equal.”144 But the Black community again made major progress
in the Civil Rights Era of the 1950s and 1960s, during which the
U.S. Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education (1954) struck
down state-mandated racial segregation in public schools.145
Several theories have emerged about this “zigzag” path of
progress, and they can roughly be grouped into two schools of
thought: Idealist and Materialist.146 The Idealists believe that Black
people “are racialized by a system of thoughts, words, messages,
stories, and scripts” that plant in many Americans’ minds deepseated images of inferiority.147 Humans can overcome this racialization through education, storytelling, and consciously rooting out
their own unconscious biases.148 If we can change the way we think
and talk about race, the Idealists say, we can straighten the zigzag
of racial progress and consistently build toward progress.149

142. Richard Delgado, Explaining the Rise and Fall of African American Fortunes—Interest
Convergence and Civil Rights Gains, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 369, 369 (2002) (reviewing
MARY L. DUZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
(2000)).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 369-70.
146. Id. at 369-71.
147. Id. at 370.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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The Materialists agree in part.150 Race and racism are ideas at
least partly under our control, they acknowledge.151 However, what
really drives change are material factors, such as “competition for
jobs, social and pecuniary advantage” and a convergence between
the interests of minorities and the interests of the powerful elite.152
A major figure in the Materialist school of thought is the late
Harvard law professor Derrick Bell.153 He first coined the term
“interest convergence” in a 1980 Harvard Law Review piece.154
Writing twenty-six years after Brown v. Board of Education, Bell
said the Court’s decision—although it seemed like a breakthrough
at the time—had yielded little in the way of social reform.155
“Demographic patterns, white flight, and the inability of the courts”
to implement Brown in a way that yielded real change had made
Brown mostly irrelevant.156
Bell then turned to an essay written by Herbert Wechsler, where
Wechsler criticized the Court for deciding Brown without a neutral
and principled basis.157 Bell responded by noting that the decision
was, in fact, based on the neutral principle of racial equality.158 But
Bell also noted that in 1954, racial equality was not valued by many
Americans as a desirable goal, so there must have been some other
motivation at play.159
Bell’s theory was that the Court’s decision to end racial segregation in public schools was due to a convergence between the
interests of Black people and the interests of whites.160 “[W]hites in
policymaking positions” saw in Brown a chance to make “economic
and political advances at home and abroad.”161

150. See id. at 371.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 518 (1980).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 519.
158. Id. at 522.
159. Id. at 525.
160. See id. at 526.
161. Id. at 524.
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Bell posited three ways the Brown ruling served the interests of
whites apart from a moral effort to redress Black suffering. First,
the desegregation of public schools helped increase American credibility in its “struggle with Communist countries to win the hearts
and minds of emerging third world peoples”—that is, people who
would be marginalized and oppressed if they lived in the United
States.162 Brown encouraged countries to resist Communism and
favor Western democracy by holding up America as a model of
equality.163
Second, Brown helped persuade Black Americans, many of whom
served during World War II, that they were a welcome part of the
United States.164 To contain a possible civil war when these soldiers
returned home from war only to face continued discrimination,
Brown would signal to them America’s commitment to equality.165
Third, Bell said that some whites realized that the South could
transition from a rural, plantation society to an industrialized one
only when it stopped struggling over state-mandated racial segregation.166
Importantly, although some scholars rejected Bell’s theory as
unfairly pessimistic, twenty years after Bell posited his theory, legal
historian Mary Dudziak unearthed significant evidence that, in fact,
Brown signaled a shift in the balance of interests, with elites finding
“powerful reason” to help African Americans.167 In a 1994 Stanford
Law Review article and in her 2000 book, Cold War Civil Rights:
Race and the Image of American Democracy, Dudziak cites hundreds
of documents and international press releases that all point to
America’s need to do something “large-scale, public and spectacular”
to bolster its international brand.168
For example, the Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson sent a
memorandum to the chairman of the Fair Employment Practices
Commission acknowledging that discriminatory conditions in
America pose “a formidable obstacle to the development of mutual
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id. at 524.
Id.
Id. at 524-25.
Id.
Id. at 525.
Delgado, supra note 142, at 372.
Id. at 373.

110

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:083

understanding and trust” abroad.169 Secretary of State Dean Rusk
noted in a memo that America’s clashes with “minority groups have
been fully treated in the press of other countries.”170 Similarly, the
U.S. ambassador to India, Chester Bowles, noted in a 1952 speech
that the “colored peoples of Asia and Africa, who total two-thirds of
the world’s population” do not think of America without also
thinking of the “limitations under which our 13 million Negroes are
living.”171
Dudziak’s investigation demonstrated that the Brown decision
had less to do with the Court’s recognition of the innate humanity,
worth, and rights of marginalized communities than the realization
among Supreme Court Justices, State Department officials, and
other powerful whites that America would “gain an edge in the Cold
War” if it publicly supported Black people.172 This is the core of
interest convergence theory—that civil rights advocacy must
account for humans’ material interests and their tribal and primal
instincts to protect their own.173
That is, groups in power will cede some of that power only when
it is in their interest to do so.174 Although humans many times act
altruistically, in the context of politics (especially the hyperpartisan
politics of today), altruism is not the primary motivator.175 This
outlook on human nature might seem bleak but it also offers hope:
If we can identify the convergence of interests that are important to
both majority and minority groups, reform and progress is possible.
Several other scholars have utilized interest convergence theory
to explain U.S. Supreme Court cases.176 Others have used interest
convergence as a way of strategizing political coalition-building.177
169. Id. at 373-74.
170. Id. at 374.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 372.
173. Id. at 371-72.
174. See id.
175. See id.
176. For a larger discussion, see, for example, Justin Driver, Rethinking the InterestConvergence Thesis, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 149 (2011).
177. Professor Cynthia Lee in her piece, Cultural Convergence: Interest Convergence Theory
Meets the Cultural Defense, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 911 (2007), uses the categories “Interest
Convergence as Explanation” and “Interest Convergence as Political Strategy.” This Article
uses the same categories.
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In the Subsections below, I explore each of those utilizations in
greater detail. In Part V, this Article applies interest convergence
theory to both areas of religious liberty.
A. Interest Convergence as Explanation
1. Hernandez v. Texas
Professor Richard Delgado has applied interest convergence to the
1954 Supreme Court case, Hernandez v. Texas.178 Mexican American
Pete Hernandez was indicted by a grand jury in Jackson County,
Texas, for the murder of another Latino.179 Before Hernandez’s trial
commenced, his lawyer moved to quash the indictment on the basis
that Mexican Americans had been “systematically excluded from
service as jury commissioners, grand jurors, and petit jurors”—this,
even though the county had a heavy Latino concentration.180
Hernandez’s lawyer argued that this exclusion of Mexican Americans deprived his client of equal protection.181
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected the argument,
holding that Mexican Americans were not a separate racial group
apart from whites under the Fourteenth Amendment.182 But the
U.S. Supreme Court disagreed, holding that Mexican Americans
were an independent racial demographic under the Amendment and
that Jackson County’s systematic exclusion of Mexican Americans
from juries deprived Hernandez of equal protection.183 The Court
noted that Mexicans in southern Texas routinely faced discrimination; whites-only bathrooms were common, and at least one local
restaurant had posted a sign barring Mexicans.184 It also noted that
“there being no members of this class among the over six thousand
jurors called in the past 25 years ... bespeaks discrimination,

178. Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Roundelay, Hernandez v. Texas and the InterestConvergence Dilemma, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 23 (2006).
179. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 476 (1954).
180. Id. at 476-77 (footnote omitted).
181. Id. at 477.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 476-78.
184. Id. at 479.
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whether or not it was a conscious decision on the part of any individual jury commissioner.”185
The Court’s language signaled a major moral breakthrough, a
recognition of the mistreatment and deep injustices faced by
Mexican Americans. But Delgado has argued that the ruling is less
an indication of a moral awakening, and more the result of interest
convergence.186
Like the majority interests articulated by Bell in his original
piece, Delgado says Hernandez was at least partly about bolstering
America’s reputation during war—this time, the Cold War.187 The
United States was competing with the Soviet Union for the allegiance of the Third World.188 The world press had publicized
American racism, and the Soviet Union had used these reports for
its own propaganda.189 To counter this messaging and broadcast to
the world that the United States was serious about minorities’
rights, the Court had to deliver a big win.190
Also, similar to Bell’s theories about Brown, the Court in Hernandez was worried about the civil unrest that would ensue when Latino veterans returned home and faced abject discrimination. Just
a few years before Hernandez, there had been significant outbreaks
of Latino activism in Denver and Los Angeles.191 In the 1942 “Sleepy
Lagoon murder,” a man named José Gallardo Diaz was found dead
by a swimming hole called Sleepy Lagoon.192 A hospital autopsy
found that he may have been drunk the night before his death and
had a skull fracture, suggesting that perhaps he had fallen or been
involved in a car accident.193 Despite lacking conclusive evidence
that Diaz was murdered, the Los Angeles Police Department arrested twenty-two Mexican American youths as suspects and held

185. Id. at 482.
186. Delgado, supra note 178, at 63.
187. Id. at 48.
188. Id. at 31.
189. Id. at 40.
190. Id. at 40-41.
191. Id. at 49.
192. History.com Editors, Man Murdered Near L.A. Reservoir, HISTORY.COM (July 30,
2020), https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/man-murdered-near-l-a-reservoir [https://
perma.cc/N89W-35RC].
193. People v. Zammora, 152 P.2d 180, 186 (Cal. Ct. App. 1944).
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them in prison without bail on charges of murder.194 They were later
imprisoned, twelve of them on counts of second-degree murder, but
in 1944 had their convictions overturned.195
Before the convictions were overturned, the Sleepy Lagoon
incident instigated the 1943 Zoot Suit Riots.196 The riots raged for
five days and pitted whites in the city against Latino residents;197
they also led to numerous similar attacks that year in Chicago, San
Diego, Detroit, and Philadelphia.198
Anti-Latino racism was so deep and pervasive that in the late
forties, the Mexican government stepped in to demand fair treatment of Mexican Americans.199 Even Eleanor Roosevelt took up the
case, as did several well-known writers such as John Steinbeck.200
At the time Hernandez was decided, then, the Court understood a
loss for Mexican Americans would not only further damage America’s international brand but it would also trigger explosive civil
unrest at home.
Even more pressing for the Court, Delgado argues, was the
concern that racism helped draw Latinos to communism.201 Latino
Americans regularly witnessed mistreatment—whether it was decorated veterans returning from war only to be denied a meal at their
local restaurants, or expansive deportation programs that compulsorily repatriated over a million Mexicans and Mexican
Americans.202 The U.S. Communist Party seized on this mounting
distaste; activists helped instigate strikes and, in 1939, The
Communist published a piece called “The Mexican Question.”203
The American elite also had serious concerns about communist
infiltration from Latin America. Assistant Secretary of State
194. Man Murdered Near L.A. Reservoir, supra note 192.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. History.com Editors, Zoot Suit Riots, HISTORY.COM (Aug. 29, 2022), https://www.
history.com/topics/world-war-ii/zoot-suit-riots [https://perma.cc/YC74-YCGE]. The Zoot Suit
Riots were so named because during the riots, the servicemen stripped Latino children and
teenagers of their zoot suits. The suits were made from large amounts of fabric and considered
unpatriotic during World War II when fabric was being rationed for the war effort.
198. Id.
199. Delgado, supra note 178, at 49.
200. Id. at 43-44.
201. Id. at 42-43.
202. Id. at 44.
203. Id. at 43-44.
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Edward Miller in 1950 warned of the dangers of communist political
aggression in Latin America.204 Secretary of State John Foster
Dulles in 1953 also counseled vigilance: “[I]f we don’t look out, we
will wake up some morning and read in the newspapers that there
happened in South America the same kind of thing that happened
in China in 1949.”205
In 1950, U.S. State Department official Louis Halle published an
influential piece in Foreign Affairs warning about the instability in
the region.206 The United States also established the School of the
Americas to thwart insurrections and teach anticommunist methods to Latin American officers.207
Multiple Justices of the Court were aware of this broader context
and had expressed their concerns publicly. Justices Hugo Black and
William Douglas and Chief Justice Earl Warren all noted that racial
discrimination in America hurt the country’s standing abroad, and
believed that adhering to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights
would help America project itself as a model of justice to other
countries.208 Justice Black commented that the “ugly facts” of racism
inflict harm to America’s standing in the world.209 Justice Douglas
had written about his trip to India in 1950 and how the first
question he received at a press conference there was about the
“lynching of Negroes.”210 A year later, Justice Douglas published his
book, Strange Lands and Friendly People, in which he reflected on
how America’s color consciousness impacted other countries’ view of
the United States.211
Justice Douglas was also aware of the communist threat in Latin
America.212 On various trips to Latin America, Justice Douglas
noted how the area was “ripe for communism.”213 He mentioned it
in a letter he wrote to a friend when Justice Douglas was sick

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id. at 49-50.
Id. at 50.
Id. at 50-51.
Id. at 51.
Id. at 52-53.
Id. at 53.
Id. at 52.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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during a trip to Panama;214 in another letter, he describes how he
traveled to Latin America to dissuade university students from
joining the Communist Party.215
Delgado also notes that Chief Justice Warren, who wrote the Hernandez decision, had previously served as the attorney general and
then the governor of California—making it highly likely that he was
aware of the Zoot Suit Riots and other anti-Latino incidents in his
state.216 Taking this all together, Delgado posits that America’s
foreign policy interests converged with the interests of Mexican
Americans in Hernandez and the interest convergence contributed
to the Court’s holding.217
2. Plyler v. Doe
Law professor María Pabón López uses interest convergence to
explain the Supreme Court case, Plyler v. Doe.218 In Plyler, the
Court struck down a Texas statute that withheld funding for the
education of undocumented children and authorized school districts
to deny enrollment to them.219 The case was the first in which the
Court stated that undocumented people constitute “persons” under
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and
that in denying them an education, Texas had violated their equal
protection rights.220
In reaching its conclusion, the Court first determined that the
appropriate level of scrutiny was rational basis.221 Despite this
assertion, however, the Court went on to apply a more demanding
standard.222 It quoted Brown’s finding that “education is perhaps the
most important function of state and local governments.”223 As such,
the state’s denial of education to the undocumented students could
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 53.
217. See id. at 54-55.
218. See María Pabón López, Reflections on Educating Latino and Latina Undocumented
Children: Beyond Plyler v. Doe, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 1373, 1337 (2005).
219. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 205, 210 (1982).
220. See id. at 210.
221. See id. at 216.
222. Id. at 223.
223. Id. at 222.
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not satisfy rational basis review unless it served a “substantial”
state goal.224 The analysis, the Court said, required an assessment
of both the costs to the nation and the interests of the innocent
children, including the fact that Texas’s denial “imposes a lifetime
hardship on a discrete class of children not accountable for their
disabling status.”225 In the Court’s view, Texas lacked the “substantial” goal needed to justify these grave injustices and the statute did
not satisfy the demands of equal protection.226
On its face, Plyler was a resounding victory for undocumented
children. The Court’s opinion included powerful language about the
importance of education and the need for equal access to prevent the
creation of a permanent caste of noncitizens destined to carry lifelong burdens.227 But, López argues, it would be a mistake to take
Plyler at face value.228
In López’s view, Plyler was at least partly the result of interest
convergence between the undocumented students and the powerful
elite, with the latter having a stake in the availability of low-wage
workers to do the work no one else wanted to do.229 López’s evidence
includes, for one, that the Immigration Reform and Control Act
(IRCA), which made it illegal to hire undocumented workers, had
not been passed at the time Plyler was decided.230 Second, higher
education remains largely inaccessible to undocumented students,
and many are still unable to work legally in the United States.231
López describes multiple legislative efforts designed to build on
Plyler and give undocumented students access to higher education,
but most of these bills never made it to a vote or were postponed
indefinitely.232 As of her writing, twenty-one states had not even
considered the issue at all.233 Litigation has also proved unsuccessful; all the cases that had been brought (as of López’s

224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Id. at 224.
Id. at 223.
See id. at 224.
See id. at 218-19.
López, supra note 218, at 1377.
Id.
Id. at 1405.
Id. at 1400.
Id. at 1400-04.
Id. at 1402.

2022]

RELIGIOUS LIBERTY INTEREST CONVERGENCE

117

writing) to challenge the denial of higher education had resulted in
losses.234
At the same time, there have been several attempts to overturn
Plyler, but those have also been unsuccessful.235 Two federal proposals from 1995 and 1996 would have effectively overruled Plyler
and permitted states to deny education to undocumented students.236 At the state level, California’s Proposition 187 in 1994
denied free public education to undocumented students but was
invalidated in a subsequent case.237
Multiple efforts have failed to build on Plyler, and still other
initiatives have failed to overrule it. Altogether, undocumented
students are allowed to stay and receive secondary education, but
their prospects beyond that are limited. In this way, instead of being
a moral breakthrough, Plyler perpetuates the second-class status of
the undocumented and ensures “a primary and secondary education
for their children, but nothing more.”238 The powerful elite want a
low-cost, dispensable labor force, and Plyler gave them exactly
that.239
3. Grutter v. Bollinger
Another example of interest convergence as explanation comes
from Bell himself, who considered Grutter v. Bollinger his interest
convergence prophecy come true.240 The crux of this theory is that
Black people will not attain benefits until those benefits also serve
the interests of whites.241 He found proof of that in the two affirmative action cases decided on the same day: Grutter and, separately,
Gratz v. Bollinger.242 In the latter, the Court struck down the
University of Michigan’s undergraduate admissions program that
automatically assigned twenty points (one-fifth of the points needed

234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

Id. at 1402-03.
Id. at 1395.
Id. at 1395-96.
Id. at 1396-97.
Id. at 1398.
Id. at 1405.
Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Diversity’s Distractions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1622, 1624 (2003).
See id.
Id.
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to gain admission) to every applicant who belonged to an underrepresented minority.243
In contrast, the Court in Grutter upheld the same university’s law
school admissions program that took race into account alongside
other diversity factors, instead of applying the “mechanical” method
of assigning points.244 Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Gratz noted the
importance of race-conscious admissions programs in remediating
the effects of a past system of racial caste.245 Bell argued, however,
that this was not enough to move the majority to vote in favor of
affirmative action.246 Something else was needed—something that
made clearer the benefit of affirmative action for whites.
The university’s lawyers and their civil rights allies knew what
that something was in Grutter—particularly when it came to Justice
O’Connor, who voted against the university in Gratz but was the
swing vote and author of the opinion in favor of the university in
Grutter.247 The lawyers lined up sixty-four amicus briefs representing over 300 organizations including, among others, labor unions,
Fortune 500 companies, and almost thirty retired military and
civilian defense officials.248 The central point in these briefs: “that
a racially diverse, well-educated work force was essential to the
success of their operations.”249 Thus, it was diversity in schools, at
work, and in the military that Justice O’Connor found appealing,
rather than the need to address past and present racial barriers.250
Bell reviewed several cases in which Justice O’Connor decided the
validity of a variety of programs that were intended to make space
for long-excluded minorities.251 His conclusion, based on this
analysis: Justice O’Connor typically struck them down while expressing concerns about their negative effects on non-minorities.252
It comes as no surprise then, Bell says, that Justice O’Connor voted
in favor of the affirmative action program in Grutter, as “[s]he
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 274-75 (2003).
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 337, 342-43 (2003).
539 U.S. at 298-301 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Bell, supra note 240, at 1624-25.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1625.
Id.
See id. at 1623-26.
Id. at 1625-26.
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evidently viewed it as a benefit and not a burden to nonminorities.”253
Citing the amicus briefs filed by the corporate and military
entities, O’Connor wrote in her Grutter majority opinion that the
law school’s admissions program “promotes learning outcomes” and
“better prepares students for an increasingly diverse workforce and
society, and better prepares them as professionals.”254 In particular,
it “‘enables [students] to better understand persons of different
races’.... ‘[C]lassroom discussion is livelier, more spirited, and
simply more enlightening and interesting’ when the students have
‘the greatest possible variety of backgrounds.’”255 As such, Bell notes,
white students benefit, and so do the “corporate and institutional
entities with which [Justice O’Connor] identifies.”256
Other scholars have debated the convergence theory in the
Grutter context, with some agreeing with Bell257 and others disagreeing.258 But the use of interest convergence in Grutter again
illustrates how it can be used to explain and complicate the analysis
of Supreme Court rulings. As with the other analyses of interest
convergence, it is meant to help explain and not minimize the
importance of the Court’s ruling.259 The analyses are not meant to
deny that there are whites for whom genuine equality is the
primary motivation. It does posit, however, that the number of such
individuals is insufficient to bring about true reform. It also suggests that the case at issue—whether it is Brown, Hernandez,
Plyler, or Grutter—would provide a short-lived or limited victory
instead of real, lasting influence.

253. Id. at 1626.
254. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003) (quoting Brief for American Educational
Research Association et al. as Amici Curiae, id. (02-241) 3).
255. Id. (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. 244a, 246a, id. (02-241)).
256. Bell, supra note 240, at 1626.
257. See, e.g., Mitchell F. Crusto, Blackness as Property: Sex, Race, Status, and Wealth, 1
STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 51, 60 (2005).
258. See, e.g., Arthur M. Wolfson, Note, Business Support of Affirmative Action and
Discriminatory Hiring Practices: Contradictory or Compatible?, 27 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 197,
210-11 (2005).
259. See generally Bell, supra note 240.
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B. Interest Convergence as Political Strategy
Beyond explaining the majoritarian politics behind rightsprotective judicial decisions, interest convergence theory also offers
a realist perspective on political coalition-building. For example, in
Shall We Overcome? Transcending Race, Class, and Ideology
Through Interest Convergence, Professor Sheryll Cashin describes
how the Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF) teaches its diverse
members to identify self-interests and use interest convergence to
work effectively toward change.260 A local IAF affiliate, the Dallas
Area Interfaith (DAI)—founded by a group of Black, Latino, and
white ministers and local leaders—utilized this approach to mobilize
Hispanic voters, which in turned was key to passing a $1.4 billion
school bond initiative.261
Another example is the Gamaliel Foundation, which has created
metropolitan-wide coalitions of local institutions that mobilize thousands of people around tax base inequity, housing, transportation,
and regional policies that drain cities and the working-class suburbs
to foster the growth of rich communities.262 Cashin locates interest
convergence in the coalition of working-class suburbs and city
dwellers.263 Although the “inner-ring of older suburbs culturally may
identify with the more affluent, job-rich outer-ring suburbs,” they
share a fiscal destiny with central cities.264 Both suffer from the
disproportionate investment in outer-ring suburbs.265
Writing about federal legislation, Professor Sudha Setty explores
bipartisan coalition-building around rights-protective legislation for
American Muslims in the post-September 11 era in her piece, National Security Convergence.266 In this context, the political selfinterests of liberal and conservative politicians from “safe” political
districts diverge markedly.267 Liberals benefit from opposing
260. Sheryll D. Cashin, Shall We Overcome? Transcending Race, Class, and Ideology
Through Interest Convergence, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 253, 281-82 (2005).
261. Id. at 284.
262. Id. at 286-87.
263. Id. at 287.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. See Sudha Setty, National Security Interest Convergence, 4 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 185
(2012).
267. Id. at 189-90.
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indefinite detention and protecting civil liberties.268 Conservatives
benefit from taking a “hawkish stance” on national security.269 They
must be “aggressive” about detention and interrogation of detainees
and “skeptical” about civil rights claims.270 For a politician to vote
for an unpopular rights-protective measure, moral imperatives are
not enough; the vote also must be politically beneficial.271 Only if
enough politicians find it politically beneficial to take civil rights
claims seriously will Congress pass rights-protective laws.272
Applying interest convergence to national security legislation,
Setty identifies fiscal responsibility as a shared interest.273 Curbing
government spending is a key piece of conservative political platforms.274 Cutting back on defense spending and expensive counterterrorism programs that have proven unnecessary helps protect
Muslim communities and reduces the U.S. budget deficit—a convergence of liberal and conservative interests.275
C. The Limitations of Interest Convergence
This Section discusses three limitations of interest convergence:
(1) remedies are short-lived, (2) interest convergence requires concessions, and (3) ideology can outweigh interest.
1. Remedies Are Short Lived
Bell saw interest convergence as one side to a two-sided coin.276
On the other side is what Bell called “involuntary racial sacrifice.”277
Black people won remedies when their interests converged with the
interests of whites.278 But Black people also see their rights
Id. at 189.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 190.
Id.
Id. at 218.
Id. at 216.
Id.
DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN
UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 69 (2004).
277. Id.
278. Id.
268.
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271.
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abrogated if those rights are seen as challenging the racial superiority of whites.279
Bell’s pessimism proved warranted when it came to the long-term
impact of Brown. Twelve years after the ruling, as he was working
through its “difficult implementation,” Bell realized that racial
segregation was just a symptom of the much more pervasive and
entrenched problem of white superiority.280 Bell quotes one of the
Brown lawyers: “Invalidating state-supported segregation, we
learned, simply meant it would shift to different but hardly less
dominating forms.”281
2. Interest Convergence Requires Concessions
Interest convergence necessarily requires working with the
powerful—sometimes oppressive—majority. This, in turn, requires
some level of sacrifice in the purity of one’s activism. Bell, for
example, expressed disappointment with the NAACP’s willingness
to change its litigation practices during the early 1950s, when
Joseph McCarthy and his anticommunist witch hunt were at the
height of their power.282 The NAACP chose not to represent Paul
Robeson, a popular singer and actor, when the government helped
end his career over his outspoken criticism of racial discrimination.283 The NAACP also did not represent one of its founders,
W.E.B. DuBois, when he was indicted under the Foreign Agents
Registration Act.284 In both cases, the NAACP feared representing
these men would make it vulnerable to charges of communist sympathizing.285 Though he acknowledges that the NAACP had valid
motivations, Bell found the NAACP’s reluctance “excessive.”286

279. Id.
280. Derrick Bell, Racial Equality: Progressives’ Passion for the Unattainable, 94 VA. L.
REV. 495, 499 (2008) (reviewing RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS
(2007)).
281. Id.
282. Id. at 508-09.
283. Id. at 509.
284. Id.
285. See id.
286. Id.
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3. Ideology Can Outweigh Interests
Interest convergence for purposes of coalition-building may prove
difficult if there is a significant conflict of ideology between the
parties involved. In the race context, ideology often makes it difficult for Black people to form coalitions with minority groups, despite
their shared interests. For example, Latinos tend to prefer building
coalitions with whites over Black people.287
IV. RELIGIOUS LIBERTY INTEREST CONVERGENCE
This Part charts a path forward for religious liberty in a polarized
age. Although numerous scholars have built upon Bell’s original
thesis about Black people’s rights by applying interest convergence
to cases involving other racial minorities, only one scholar has
applied it to religious minorities,288 and no one has considered its
implications for the status of religious minorities in today’s politicized religious liberty landscape. This Part tackles both challenges.
In its analysis of religious liberty interest convergence, Muslims are
the minoritized group and conservative, white Christians are the
powerful majority that will be more inclined to coalition-build with
Muslims when it serves its self-interest. Part IV.A will map how the
conservative, Christian Justices of the Court reflect the interests of
conservative Christians broadly.
Of course, religion and race are deeply interwoven in the public
imagination. Whereas Christianity is often imagined as a white,
Western, and American religion, Islam is perceived as a non-white,
Eastern tradition.289 One is domestic, one is foreign—one is “us,”
and one is “other.”290 Some scholars have even argued that Islam
has become “racialized” in the United States; that is, Muslims are
perceived as uniformly non-white (specifically, “brown”) and treated
287. Cashin, supra note 260, at 279.
288. Stephen M. Feldman, Principle, History, and Power: The Limits of the First
Amendment Religion Clauses, 81 IOWA L. REV. 833, 871 (1996) (applying interest convergence
theory to “explain why the separation of church and state often provides only minimal benefits
to outgroup religions”).
289. Hadi Khoshneviss, The Inferior White: Politics and Practices of Racialization of People
from the Middle East in the U.S., 19 ETHNICITIES 117, 121 (2019).
290. See id. at 120.
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as a racial rather than religious minority.291 These considerations
will be relevant to the discussion in Part V about the role of ideology
convergence vis-à-vis interest convergence.
On the flipside, religious liberty convergence is different in important ways from racial interest convergence. In Bell’s analysis of
Brown, the powerful whites had one set of interests while Black
people had a different set of interests.292 In contrast, the religious
liberty tradition has long understood that believers of both majority
and minority faiths (or no faith) have the same interest in broad
religious freedom protections. Favoring some religions over others
only weakens the protections for all; that is, religious freedom for
some is religious freedom for none. While the politicized religious
liberty context often muddles this basic fact for many Americans, at
least one nationally prominent conservative religious liberty law
firm has a strong grasp on this principle. Moreover, there is a long
history in the religious freedom tradition of protecting both majority
and minority groups. Numerous leaders in early America offered
spiritual and pragmatic arguments for religious freedom, which in
turn undergird constitutional protections for religious freedom.
Part IV.B uses interest convergence theory to explain the contrasting results in Hawaii versus Tanvir. It assesses both cases
against the backdrop of the current politicized religious liberty
landscape and the conservative Justices’ apparent alignment with
the conservative faction of that culture war. Based on this assessment, Part IV.B offers several areas of interest convergence between
the conservative Justices and the Muslim men in Tanvir and then
argues that many of those same interests were not as clearly at
stake in Hawaii. In Hawaii, the conservative Justices were also
strongly disincentivized against ruling for the Muslim claimants.
Next, Part IV.C uses the convergence points to devise a political
strategy for Muslim-Christian coalition-building on religious liberty.
Finally, Part IV.D explores religious liberty interest convergence as
constitutional justification.

291. See, e.g., Nagwa Ibrahim, The Origins of Muslim Racialization in U.S. Law, 7 UCLA
J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E.L. 121, 135 (2008).
292. See Bell, supra note 280, at 499.
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A. Conservative Justices and the Interests of White Conservative
Christians
That the conservative, Christian Justices of the Court reflect the
interests of conservative Christians broadly is evidenced by (1) the
Justices’ explicit statements both in Court opinions and in public
statements; (2) empirical studies tracking outcomes in religious
rights cases; and (3) circumstantial evidence, including (a) the rise
of a conservative legal movement designed to replace liberal Justices with conservative ones that share the movement’s interests
and (b) the active involvement of religious conservatives in the
judicial confirmation process.
The first set of proofs—the Justices’ explicit statements—are
incorporated into the relevant portions of the discussion in Part
IV.B. In addition to parsing the Court’s opinion in Tanvir, Part IV.B
details statements by the conservative Justices that indicate their
interest in particular religious liberty outcomes. But before delving
into that evidence, this Part will explore empirical and circumstantial evidence.
1. Empirical Evidence
In a study published in 2022, Professors Lee Epstein and Eric
Posner found that the Roberts Court has transformed the constitutional protection for religion.293 They reviewed every Supreme Court
case from the 1953 to the 2020 Term that involved the Free Exercise
or Establishment Clauses and resulted in a judicial opinion, excluding cases that were decided without oral argument.294 In total,
they reviewed 95 cases consisting of 841 votes by 32 Justices.295
Epstein and Posner categorized votes that favored a religious
outcome as “pro-religion.”296 They found that, over the entire studied
period, the Court voted pro-religion 59 percent of the time but that
number jumped to 83 percent in the Roberts Court.297 The Solicitor
293. Lee Epstein & Eric A. Posner, The Roberts Court and the Transformation of Constitutional Protections for Religion: A Statistical Portrait, 2021 SUP. CT. REV. 315, 315-16.
294. Id. at 323.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 324.
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General’s participation in religion cases also rose dramatically—
from 9 percent during the Warren Court (1953-1969) to 89 percent
in the Roberts Court.298
The researchers then redefined pro-religion to mean pro-mainstream Christians, noting that the presence of mainstream Christian plaintiffs in religious rights cases before the Supreme Court is
a relatively recent phenomenon.299 In the Warren Court, no religious
plaintiff belonged to a mainstream Christian religion.300 After 1969,
this begins to change as the Court moved right, so that during the
Roberts Court, “nine mainstream Christian plaintiffs win seven of
their cases.”301 Epstein and Posner labeled these pro-religion rulings
“pro-mainstream Christian,” and found that—much like the win
rate for pro-religion rulings—the win rate rose gradually from 44
percent to 57 percent, and then jumped to 80 percent in the Roberts
Court.302 Another way to look at the patterns across pro-religion and
pro-mainstream Christian rulings: before the Roberts Court, proreligion rulings were mostly for religious minorities, and the
Roberts Court extended those same protections to religious majorities.303
Epstein and Posner go on to argue that the transformation of
religious outcomes can be attributed to the ideologies of the Justices.304 They break down pro-religion votes of all Justices from 1953
onward and find that the top five pro-religion Justices sit on the
Roberts Court.305 All five are Republican appointees, ideologically
conservative, and religiously devout.306 Epstein and Posner also note
that the Roberts Court is not just the most pro-religion—it is also
the most polarized, with two of the least pro-religion Justices
(Sotomayor and Ginsburg) sitting (or having sat) on the Roberts
Court.307

298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.

Id.
Id. at 325-26.
Id.
Id. at 326.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 326-27.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 327.
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There is a caveat to these numbers: the case volume is low (Justice Kavanaugh heard only six of the cases whereas Justice Thomas
heard thirty-six cases).308 Because Epstein and Posner considered
only cases that were argued, they omit two cases where Chief
Justice Roberts joined the liberal Justices in ruling against religious
challenges to COVID-19 orders.309 Still, it remains indisputable that
partisan polarization on religion is growing.
Epstein and Posner explain their findings this way: “The conservative bloc on the Supreme Court sees the promotion of religious
rights as a legitimate way to push back on the socially liberal
rulings of the court.”310 For more than fifty years, Conservatives
complained about Supreme Court rulings that have, on the one
hand, established protections for contraception, abortion, and the
rights of sexual minorities, and on the other, provided relatively
weak constitutional protections for religious actors, particularly
conservative Christians, who lost disputes related to holiday
displays on government property or prayer in public schools.311 To
push back against both trends, the conservative Justices have
strengthened religious rights for conservative Christians.312 “This
jurisprudential move mirrors a broader trend in the country,”
Epstein and Posner explain.313 In other words, the conservative,
Christian Justices reflect the interests of conservative Christians in
the United States today.
Other researchers studying judicial decision-making and religious
rights cases have found similar trends. The COVID-19 cases provide
the most recent set of proofs. Faced with a series of cases where
religious organizations challenged the impact of pandemic lockdown
orders on houses of worship, judges in lower courts voted in politically predictable ways.314 Zalman Rothschild in Free Exercise
308. Lee Epstein & Eric Posner, How the Religious Right Has Transformed the Supreme
Court, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/22/opinion/supremecourt-religion.html [https://perma.cc/Z424-J4P7]. The final, published version of the study
added two cases heard by Justice Kavanaugh and three additional cases heard by Justice
Thomas. Epstein & Posner, supra note 293, at 328.
309. Epstein & Posner, supra note 308.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Zalman Rothschild, Free Exercise Partisanship, 107 CORNELL L. REV. 1067 (2022).
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Partisanship found that 82 percent of Trump-appointed judges ruled
for the religious organizations while 100 percent of Democratappointed judges ruled for the government (non-Trump-appointed
Republican judges split).315
In another study, researchers found that Democrat- and Republican-appointed judges in lower federal courts vote in ideologically
predictable ways in Establishment Clause cases.316 In this context,
ruling against an Establishment Clause challenge is the “proreligion” position, and upholding the challenge is the “anti-religion”
one. The study found that Democrat-appointed judges took the antireligion position 57.3 percent of the time, and that number fell to
25.4 percent with Republican-appointed judges.317
2. Circumstantial Evidence
Former Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia’s death in the
months before former President Trump’s 2016 election made the
appointment of a conservative Justice front and center for a lot of
would-be Trump voters.318 And as Trump went on during his term
to appoint hundreds of lower federal court judges and three
Supreme Court Justices,319 numerous researchers and journalists
probed the influence of conservative groups on Trump’s selection
process.320
The latter inquiry focused on the rise of the Federalist Society,
which experts describe as having a “monopoly” on the Supreme

315. See id. at 1068.
316. Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Ideology “All the Way Down”? An Empirical Study
of Establishment Clause Decisions in the Federal Courts, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1201, 1201 (2012).
317. Id. at 1204-05.
318. David Frum, The Supreme Court Isn’t a Sufficient Reason to Vote for Trump, ATLANTIC
(Aug. 4, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/08/scotus-not-a-good-reasonto-vote-trump/494630/ [https://perma.cc/5S24-6AM4].
319. John Gramlich, How Trump Compares with Other Recent Presidents in Appointing
Federal Judges, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Jan. 13, 2021), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/
01/13/how-trump-compares-with-other-recent-presidents-in-appointing-federal-judges/
[https://perma.cc/627X-57SX].
320. NOAH FELDMAN, TAKEOVER: HOW A CONSERVATIVE STUDENT CLUB CAPTURED THE
SUPREME COURT (2021); The Money Behind Conservative Legal Movement, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/03/19/us/politics/document-Conservative
Donors-DocCloud.html [https://perma.cc/NAM3-E288].
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Court appointment process321—so much so that the current conservative Justices of the Court are considered “Federalist Society
judges.”322 The Society identifies qualified candidates who could be
trusted to remain reliably conservative, including on matters pertaining to religious rights.323 An investigation into the Society’s
creation and impact is beyond the scope of this Article, but its central role in Trump’s many judicial picks establishes a connection
between conservative Justices and a conservative legal movement
whose interests the Justices are expected to uphold.324
The Court’s June 2022 decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s
Health Organization provides a particularly pointed example of this
expectation.325 In Dobbs, the Court overruled Roe v. Wade,326 a 1973
decision establishing a constitutional right to abortion.327 As numerous news outlets reported, the conservative legal movement had
for fifty years worked toward that precise goal by, among other
things, helping place Justices on the Court that would serve that
purpose.328
Similarly, conservative Justices are most certainly aware of religious Conservatives’ active role in the confirmation process. For
example, in the wake of Justice Ginsburg’s death in 2020, numerous
321. Dylan Matthews & Byrd Pinkerton, The Incredible Influence of the Federalist Society,
Explained, VOX (June 3, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2019/6/3/1863
2438/federalist-society-leonard-leo-brett-kavanaugh [https://perma.cc/29MM-RXAY].
322. Caroline Fredrickson & Eric J. Segall, Opinion, Trump Judges or Federalist Society
Judges? Try Both, N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/20/opinion/
trump-judges-federalist-society.html [https://perma.cc/6QSC-TV7F].
323. See id.
324. Another conservative organization, the Judicial Crisis Network, has also been identified as a central player in the selection and vetting of judges at both the federal and state
levels. Elizabeth Williamson, With Barrett Nomination, a D.C. Conservative Power Couple
Nears Its Dream, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/15/us/politics/
severinos-amy-coney-barrett.html [https://perma.cc/7CKQ-KK6W].
325. See 142 S. Ct. 2228 (2022).
326. Id. at 2284-85.
327. 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973).
328. All Things Considered, How Conservatives Worked for Decades to Fill Courts with
Anti-Abortion Rights Judges, NPR (June 26, 2022, 5:02 PM), https://www.npr.org/2022/06/26/
1107713225/how-conservatives-worked-for-decades-to-fill-courts-with-anti-abortion-rights-ju
[https://perma.cc/JRY4-W6H5]; Edwin Meese III, Opinion, Did the Conservative Legal
Movement Succeed? That All Depends on Whether the Supreme Court Overrules Roe v. Wade,
WASH. POST (Nov. 29, 2021, 9:48 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/11/29/
did-conservative-legal-movement-succeed-that-all-depends-whether-supreme-court-overrulesroe-v-wade/ [https://perma.cc/9P2E-UG7N].
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conservative Christian groups mobilized to pressure Senate Republicans to speedily confirm Trump’s nominee.329 As one New York
Times piece explains, Justice Ginsburg’s death gave these religious
conservatives a chance to fulfill “their long-denied goal of shifting
the Supreme Court decisively to the right.”330 The Christian groups
seized the opportunity and worked to secure the appointment with
the expectation that a conservative Justice would reflect—and
protect—their interests.331
B. Religious Liberty Interest Convergence as an Explanation:
Tanzin v. Tanvir Versus Trump v. Hawaii
On December 10, 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court in Tanzin v.
Tanvir ruled unanimously in favor of three Muslim men who alleged
they were placed on the no-fly list by Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents in retaliation for their refusal to spy on their
religious community.332 The Muslim men had argued under the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) that the FBI forced them
to choose between their religious beliefs and being subjected to the
punishment of placement on the no-fly list.333
The no-fly list is developed and maintained by the federal
Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) and administered by the FBI.334
The TSC maintains a database with information about individuals
who are known to have or are reasonably suspected of committing
terrorist activity.335 The TSC places the names of such individuals
on the no-fly list and shares it with the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) and airline representatives, in addition to
state and federal law enforcement agencies.336
329. Jeremy W. Peters, “This Is Why We Wanted This Guy”: Conservatives Push Trump to
Fill Court Seat Quickly, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/19/us/
politics/trump-supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/5LER-CL85].
330. Id.
331. See id.
332. See 141 S. Ct. 486, 489 (2020).
333. See id.
334. TERRORIST SCREENING CTR., FBI 1-2, https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/about-us/tenyears-after-the-fbi-since-9-11/just-the-facts-1/terrorist-screening-center-1[https://perma.cc/
S9QX-PMSP].
335. Id.
336. Id.
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The plaintiffs in Tanvir alleged that federal law enforcement and
intelligence agencies can also “nominate” individuals for the no-fly
list if they have “reasonable suspicion[s]” that the individual is a
“known or suspected terrorist” and poses a terrorist threat on an
aircraft.337 People on the no-fly list are banned from plane trips that
start or end in the United States or involve flying over the United
States.338
The Tanvir plaintiffs also alleged that the federal agents named
in the lawsuit took advantage of the opaque standards for placing
someone on the no-fly list to attempt to coerce plaintiffs into becoming informants within their religious communities and places of
worship.339 When plaintiffs refused, the FBI agents placed them on
the no-fly list.340
1. Tanvir’s Story
The saga began when FBI Special Agent FNU Tanzin and
another agent approached the lead plaintiff in the case, Muhammad
Tanvir, in February 2007 to question him about an acquaintance
who entered the country illegally.341 The agents questioned Tanvir
for thirty minutes and then, two days later, Tanzin called Tanvir
again to ask if Tanvir had any information to share with him.342
In July 2008, when Tanvir returned home from a trip to Pakistan
to visit family, he was detained at the John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK) by federal agents for five hours.343 They
confiscated Tanvir’s passport and told him he could retrieve it six
months later, in January 2009.344 Tanzin and another agent later
visited Tanvir at his workplace and asked him to come into the
FBI’s Manhattan office, where the FBI agents went on to question
Tanvir for an hour.345 They asked him whether he was aware of

337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.

Tanvir v. Tanzin, 894 F.3d 449, 454 (2d Cir. 2018), aff’d, 141 S. Ct. 486 (2020).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 455.
Id.
Id.
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Taliban training camps near Tanvir’s home in Pakistan and
whether he himself had received Taliban training.346 Tanvir told
them he was unaware of the camps and had never been trained by
the Taliban.347
After the questioning, the agents asked Tanvir if he could work
as an informant for the FBI in Pakistan or Afghanistan.348 Tanvir
alleged that the agents offered him multiple incentives, but Tanvir
declined.349 The agents then persisted and even threatened to
withhold Tanvir’s passport and deport him if he did not cooperate.350
The next day, Tanzin and the other FBI agent contacted Tanvir and
again threatened him with deportation for failure to cooperate as an
informant, to which Tanvir again declined.351
In January 2009, Tanvir received his passport from Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) officers at JFK Airport.352 The next
day, Tanzin called Tanvir and told him his passport had been
released only because Tanvir was “cooperative” with the FBI.353 The
FBI pressure continued the next few weeks, including calls and
visits at Tanvir’s workplace.354 Later, the agents asked Tanvir to
submit to a polygraph test and when he declined, threatened to
arrest him.355
In January 2010, Tanvir took a job as a long-haul trucker.356 He
often had to fly home after he completed his deliveries.357 In October
2010, as he tried boarding a flight in Atlanta, he was turned away
and instead taken by two FBI agents to a bus station, where he had
to take a twenty-four-hour bus ride home.358 Two days later, another
agent, Sanya Garcia, contacted him and told him she would help
remove his name from the no-fly list if he met with her for
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
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Id.
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Id.
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questioning.359 Tanvir declined, saying he had already answered
the FBI’s questions.360
Because he believed he was unable to fly, Tanvir quit his job;
however, the difficulties continued.361 On multiple occasions, he
bought plane tickets to visit his ailing mother in Pakistan, but in
each case, he was not permitted to fly.362 Throughout this period, he
was informed repeatedly by FBI agents that they could help him get
off the no-fly list if he agreed to serve as an FBI informant.363 The
two other men in the case alleged they were placed under similar
pressure.364
After the plaintiffs sued the agents in 2013, and just four days
before oral arguments on the government’s motion to dismiss, the
government took the plaintiffs off the no-fly list.365 It claimed that
the plaintiffs’ experience was due to “misidentification against a
government record” or “random selection” and that the government
would update its record.366 There was no guarantee the government
would not put them back on the list, and there was also no compensation for the hardship and financial loss the men suffered because
of their placement on the list.367 Their placement had resulted in
unused airline tickets and lost income when they were unable to
take advantage of job opportunities.368 Injunctive relief was
inadequate to compensate the men for their injuries, which raised
the question of whether the plaintiffs could sue the FBI agents for
money damages under the RFRA.369
A federal district court dismissed the men’s claims for financial
relief, holding that the RFRA did not allow claimants to sue federal
officials in their personal capacity for money damages.370 The
359. Id. at 456.
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. Id. at 454, 456-57.
364. Tanvir v. Lynch, 128 F. Supp. 3d 756, 764 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), rev’d in part sub nom.
Tanvir v. Tanzin, 889 F. 3d 72 (2d Cir. 2018), aff’d, 141 S. Ct. 486 (2020).
365. Tanzin, 894 F.3d at 456.
366. Id.
367. See id.
368. See id.
369. See id. at 457.
370. Id.
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Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed that ruling, and the federal government sought review at the Supreme Court.371
2. The Legal Arguments
Two of the main arguments in Tanvir had to do with the implications of money damages for national security and the nature of the
RFRA.
a. Implications for National Security
A key part of the government’s argument was that provision of
money damages would compromise national security.372 The government appealed to themes likely to resonate with the conservative
Justices. It called attention to the “Court’s hesitation in recognizing
new Bivens causes of action” and argued that providing money
damages under a statute like the RFRA, which is designed to create
exemptions from generally applicable laws, would dissuade law
enforcement officials from performing their duties robustly.373
Officials would have to decide on the spot whether to create an
exemption from the rule he or she was supposed to be enforcing.374
If money damages were available, the official would likely decide
against enforcement.375
This, the government argued, is particularly dangerous when it
comes to federal agents protecting national security, as in Tanvir:
“Personal damage actions are especially concerning in the national
security context, where ... the President and the Executive have
special responsibilities under ... Article II and have sensitivities
within those by lists.”376 The language was fine tuned to appeal to
Justice Thomas’ National Security Fundamentalism (recall that in
Hamdi, Justice Thomas argued that “[i]t is ‘obvious and unarguable’
that no governmental interest is more compelling than the security

371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.

Tanzin v. Tanvir, 141 S. Ct. 486, 489 (2020).
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 7, at 28.
Id. at 14-15.
Id. at 13-15.
See id.
Id. at 28.
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of the Nation. The national security, after all, is the primary responsibility and purpose of the Federal Government.”).377
In contrast, Tanvir acknowledged that the government’s qualified
immunity defense gave it wide protection, but he also made clear
that the RFRA’s encroachment on the Executive’s national security
responsibilities is potentially broad.378 During oral arguments,
Justice Thomas asked whether the RFRA has a mens rea requirement, that is, whether the RFRA requires that the federal official
intend to burden the claimant’s free exercise rights.379 Tanvir
responded that the RFRA does not have a mens rea requirement
and only requires that the burden be “substantial,” not intentional.380
b. The Nature of RFRA
There was considerable discussion during oral argument about
what precisely the RFRA accomplished in the aftermath of the
Court’s 1990 Smith decision.381 The government argued that the
RFRA merely restored the pre-Smith standard and is therefore
limited to equitable relief because the RFRA did not significantly
depart from the established remedial scheme at the time Smith was
decided.382 On the other hand, Tanvir argued that the RFRA was
intended to do much more than merely restore the pre-Smith
standard.383
During the arguments, Justice Breyer described the RFRA as an
effort to put into statutory form a constitutional interpretation that
Smith rejected.384 He called the RFRA a constitutional statute, or a
way of implementing what Congress thinks is the correct interpretation of the First Amendment; given the remedial scheme in place
at the time, this did not include personal action.385
377. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 580 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted) (quoting Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981)).
378. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 7, at 31.
379. Id. at 35-36.
380. Id. at 36.
381. See id. at 38-39.
382. See id. at 19-20.
383. Id. at 39.
384. Id. at 38.
385. Id.

136

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:083

In response, Tanvir invoked Hobby Lobby.386 The Court knows
how to tether statutes to specific jurisprudence, Tanvir noted, but
in Hobby Lobby, the Court did not do that.387 To the contrary, the
Court explicitly noted that the RFRA marks “a complete separation
from First Amendment case law.”388 In fact, in Bostock v. Clayton
County, the Court described the RFRA as a “super-statute.”389
Tanvir used this phrasing to address Justice Sotomayor’s question
during oral arguments about whether the statute needs some sort
of explicit text permitting monetary damages.390 In response, Tanvir
used the Court’s own words to describe the RFRA as not just any
other statute but a “super-statute.”391
As a super-statute, Tanvir argued, the RFRA expanded protections for religious exercise in part by providing relief appropriate
to the injury.392 When injunctive relief was insufficient, money
damages would be the only appropriate relief.393 In Tanvir, the
government placed petitioners on the no-fly list and then removed
them immediately prior to oral arguments on petitioner’s motion to
dismiss in order to moot the case.394 As one conservative religious
liberty law firm argued in its amicus brief, this also leaves the
government free to continue its gamesmanship, adding then removing individuals from the no-fly list with impunity.395 Money
damages would help prevent the gamesmanship.396

386. Id. at 38-39.
387. Id.
388. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 696 (2014).
389. 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1754 (2020); Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 7, at 43.
390. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 7, at 42-43.
391. Id. at 43.
392. Id. at 44.
393. Id. at 43-44.
394. Brief of Respondents at 9, Tanzin v. Tanvir, 141 S. Ct. 486 (2020) (No. 19-71) (“On
June 8, 2015, four days before oral argument on the government’s motions to dismiss in the
district court and less than a week after Respondents pursued the modified TRIP procedure,
DHS informed Respondents that the government ‘knows of no reason why they would be
unable to fly.’”).
395. Brief for The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 17-18, Tanzin v. Tanvir, 141 S. Ct. 486 (2020) (No. 19-71).
396. Id. at 2-3.
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c. The Court’s Ruling
On December 10, 2020, the Court ruled unanimously that the
three Muslim men could sue the FBI agents for money damages.397
In a brief opinion by Justice Thomas, the Court said the RFRA’s text
giving claimants the right to “obtain appropriate relief against a
government” meant that claimants can sue government officials in
their personal capacities.398 Moreover, “appropriate relief” included
money damages, which Justice Thomas said “have long been
awarded as appropriate relief ” and, in cases like Tanvir’s, are the
only adequate remedy.399 Justice Thomas noted, “it would be odd to
construe RFRA in a manner that prevents courts from awarding
such relief.”400
At least with respect to the remedies portion of the RFRA, the
Court did not adopt Justice Alito’s stance in Hobby Lobby that the
“RFRA did more than merely restore the balancing test used in the
Sherbert line of [Free Exercise] cases; it provided even broader
protection for religious liberty than was available under those
decisions.”401 Justice Thomas in Tanvir instead wrote that the
“RFRA sought to counter the effect of that holding and restore the
pre-Smith ‘compelling interest test.’”402 In other words, the RFRA
did not go beyond the pre-Smith regime but instead restored that
regime.403
In further assessing what Congress intended the RFRA to do, the
Court looked at the “legal ‘backdrop’” against which the statute was
enacted, which included “one of the most well-known civil rights
statutes: 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”404 As the Court noted, “[t]hat statute
applies to ‘person[s] ... under color of any statute,’” and the Court
has long interpreted it as permitting individual capacity suits.405
397. See Tanvir, 141 S. Ct. at 493. The decision was 8-0. Justice Barrett took no part in the
consideration or decision of the case, as it was argued before she was confirmed to fill the
vacancy left open by the death of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. See id.
398. Id. at 490, 492.
399. Id. at 491.
400. Id. at 492.
401. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 695 n.3 (2014).
402. Tanvir, 141 S. Ct. at 489.
403. See id. at 492.
404. Id. at 490.
405. Id.
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Notably, the Court found that religious freedom belongs in the “very
same field of civil rights law” as other claims under Section 1983.406
“Because RFRA uses the same terminology as § 1983 in the very
same field of civil rights law,” the Court said, “‘it is reasonable to
believe that the terminology bears a consistent meaning.’”407
Also notable is Justice Thomas’s rejection of the government’s
argument that permitting government officials to be liable for
monetary damages “could raise separation-of-powers concerns.”408
Instead, Justice Thomas said that “this exact remedy has coexisted
with our constitutional system since the dawn of the Republic.”409
While there may be reasons to prevent liability for government
officials, those are policy considerations for Congress, not the
Court.410 Justice Thomas appears to have departed from his posture
of National Security Fundamentalism, that is, that the executive
branch’s interest in protecting national security permits it to limit
individual liberty and that judicial interference would destroy the
purpose of vesting national security responsibilities in the Executive.411
What might account for the change of heart? This Article argues
that religious liberty interest convergence helps explain the results
in Tanvir.
3. Conservative Christians’ Interests at Stake in Tanvir
The Court’s decision in Tanvir was necessary to correct a grave
injustice. But the case—and Justice Thomas’s abdication, it
appears, of National Security Fundamentalism—cannot be fully
understood without consideration of the broader context of the
religious liberty culture wars.412 That context reveals what was at
stake for conservative Christians—including, for example, the group

406. Id.
407. Id. at 490-91 (quoting ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 323 (2012)).
408. Id. at 493.
409. Id.
410. See id.
411. See Sunstein, supra note 92, at 695.
412. See Brief of Religious Organizations, Public Speakers and Scholars as Amici Curiae
in Support of Respondents at 6, Tanvir, 141 S. Ct. (No. 19-71).
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of inveterate and well-known conservative individuals and organizations that filed an amicus brief in support of the Muslim men in
Tanvir.413 Represented by the conservative religious liberty law
firm, First Liberty Institute, the following entities signed on to the
brief: the Billy Graham Evangelistic Association, a group founded
by Graham to evangelize in America and abroad; Samaritan’s Purse,
an evangelical organization that offers relief aid worldwide; the
Chuck Colson Center for Christian Worldview, which seeks to create
a movement that “defend[s] the Christian worldview,” and the
Center’s president, John Stonestreet; two professors who teach at
evangelical schools; and Eric Metaxas, a major conservative public
figure and devoted supporter of former President Trump.414 Metaxas
is also avowedly anti-Islam; his position is perhaps best captured in
an interview with the Christian website, The Stream:
Without getting into the details, Islam has historically tended to
work against the kind of freedom we have in the United States.
Indeed, it tends toward theocracy, toward merging “church and
state”—or “mosque and state”—into something that coerces faith
and thus blurs the line between the laws of the state and the
laws of God. There’s no room for “religious liberty” in a world
where the state has taken over religion, or where religion has
taken over the state. That’s the genius of the Founders in
keeping the state out of the faith of its citizens. Islam also
typically teaches that one can convert to Islam but never away
from Islam, so one is not at all free. Freedom of conscience is
defenestrated, along with anyone thought to be gay. So, alas,
Islam is generally incompatible with American liberty.415

Metaxas so believes in Islam’s incompatibility with American liberty
that he tweeted that last line to promote the interview.416 Metaxas
also wrote the foreword to The Hidden Enemy: Aggressive Secularism, Radical Islam, and the Fight for Our Future, a book—published
413. See id. at 1-4.
414. Id.
415. John Zmirak, Author Eric Metaxas Asks if American Democracy Will Survive, STREAM
(June 17, 2016) (emphasis added), https://stream.org/author-eric-metaxas-asks-americandemocracy-will-survive/ [https://perma.cc/B4AM-SJQ9].
416. Eric Metaxas (@ericmetaxas), TWITTER (June 18, 2016, 8:30 AM), https://twitter.com/
ericmetaxas/status/744145146317516800?lang:en [https://perma.cc/A72P-TNCF].
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by a conservative Christian publisher—that sets out to “show[ ] how
we can ... beat back the threat of radical Islam.”417
And yet, Metaxas signed onto a brief in support of Muslim men
who were being recruited to serve federal national security imperatives.418 Why? This Section explores the interests Metaxas and his
fellow Christian conservatives had in Tanvir. In parsing the interests at stake, this Article is the first to apply interest convergence
theory to the national religious liberty debate and religious freedom
jurisprudence.
a. Disincentivize Government Limits on Christian Religious
Claims Related to Changing Sexual Norms
As discussed above, conservative Christians in recent years have
brought religious liberty claims to defend their ability to live
according to their traditional beliefs about sexuality in a fastchanging culture.419 Those claims include multiple by Christian
wedding vendors like Jack Phillips in Masterpiece who decline to
serve gay couples.420 Although Tanvir’s holding that religious
claimants can sue government officials in their personal capacity
applies only to federal officials being sued under the Federal RFRA,
its reasoning can be extended to laws that make state officials liable
for religious liberty violations.421 That means government officials
enforcing state antidiscrimination laws against conservative Christians who object to same-sex marriage (for example, the state civil
rights commissioners in Masterpiece) may become more hesitant to
do so because they might be held personally liable.422
Also relevant in this context is Justice Thomas’s language in
Tanvir that religious freedom belongs in the “very same field of civil
417. The Hidden Enemy: Aggressive Secularism, Radical Islam, and the Fight for Our Future, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/Hidden-Enemy-%20Aggressive-Secularism-Radicalebook/dp/B073RSBCZH [https://perma.cc/Y5VD-C3MJ].
418. See Brief for Religious Organizations, Public Speakers and Scholars as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents, supra note 412, at 3.
419. See supra Part II.A.
420. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
421. Ian Millhiser, A Heartbreaking Supreme Court Case Could Be a Huge Win for the
Christian Right, VOX (Nov. 26, 2019, 8:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/
11/26/20982273/supreme-court-religion-tanvir-tanzin-rfra [https://perma.cc/9QC4-K49N].
422. See id.
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rights law” as other claims under Section 1983.423 The current
political debate around religious freedom often highlights apparent
conflicts between religious freedom and the rights of others.424
Specifically, it juxtaposes religious freedom against the right to
nondiscrimination, particularly in the case of sexual minorities.425
For example, the Do No Harm Act addresses this precise tension.426
The Court’s opinion situating the RFRA and religious freedom in
the broader context of civil rights can be interpreted as a counter to
such claims; it emphasizes that religious freedom is an important
civil right as opposed to a threat to civil rights.
b. Bolster the Legal and Cultural Status of Religious Liberty
Relatedly, but more broadly, permitting money damages under
the RFRA bolsters the legal and cultural status of religious liberty.
Many conservatives believe that religious liberty in America is
under threat.427 In 2012 and 2014, the PRRI measured the percentage of Americans who think religious liberty is under threat.428
When asked, “In America today, do you believe that the right of
religious liberty is being threatened, or not?” 54 percent said yes in
May 2014.429 That number was 39 percent in March 2012 and 50
percent in November 2012.430 The percentage of Americans who
completely agreed that “[t]he right of religious liberty is being
threatened in America today” increased from 18 percent in June
2012 to 28 percent in July 2014.431 An August 2020 survey by the
University of Chicago Divinity School and AP-NORC found that
across America’s largest religious denominations, Evangelical
423. 141 S. Ct. 486, 490-91 (2020).
424. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
425. See supra Part II.A.
426. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
427. See Daniel Cox & Robert P. Jones, Majority of Americans Do Not Believe Religious
Liberty is Under Attack, PUB. RELIGION RSCH. INST. (Mar. 15, 2012), https://www.prri.org/
research/march-%20rns-2012-research/ [https://perma.cc/AR3M-BYPG].
428. See id.; Press Release, Majority of Americans Still Support Contraception Coverage
Mandate, PUB. RELIGION RSCH. INST. (June 2, 2014), https://www.prri.org/press-release/newsrelease-contraception/ [https://perma.cc/M6JZ-VUMW].
429. Kirby Goidel, Brian Smentkowski & Craig Freeman, Perceptions of Threat to Religious
Liberty, 49 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 426, 427 (2016).
430. Id.
431. Id.
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Protestants were “especially likely to perceive risks to their freedom
to worship.”432 Headlines by conservative groups capture the prevailing sentiment: the Evangelical Biola University, the Christian
Post, the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, and the conservative
Heritage Foundation, among others, have put out pieces on “current” or “continuing” threats to religious liberty.433
The Trump administration seized on these perceptions of threat.
Then-candidate Trump throughout his campaign promised that the
“first priority of my administration will be to preserve and protect
our religious liberty.”434 After his election (made possible in large
part by the 81 percent of white Evangelicals who voted for him),
Trump kept his promise by instituting the expansive religious
liberty protections his conservative Christian supporters wanted.435
In May 2017, President Trump issued an executive order
directing the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and
other federal agencies to exempt religious organizations from the
contraceptive mandate.436 In November 2018, the government issued
a new rule formally exempting all religious objectors from the
Affordable Care Act’s contraceptive mandate and leaving in place
the accommodation that delivered the drugs to employees without

432. Elana Schor & Hannah Fingerhut, Religious Freedom in America: Popular and
Polarizing, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 5, 2020), https://www.apnews.com/article/donald-trumpreligion-u-s-news-virus-outbreak-reinventing-faith-535624d93b8ce3d271019200e362b0cf
[https://perma.cc/E98A-5NXU].
433. Michael Koby, The Biggest Threat to Religious Liberty, BIOLA MAG. (Aug. 31, 2006),
https://www.biola.edu/blogs/biola-magazine/2006/the-biggest-threat-to-religious-liberty
[https://perma.cc/S2WQ-CDZJ]; USCCB, CURRENT THREATS TO RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 1, 1
(2018), https://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/religious-liberty/upload/Current-threats-toreligious-liberty.pdf [https://perma.cc/XT3H-MBLX]; Michael Gryboski, What Are the Biggest
Threats to Religious Liberty in the US?, CHRISTIAN POST (Oct. 21, 2019),
https://www.christianpost. com/books/what-are-the-biggest-threats-to-religious-liberty-in-theus.html [https://perma.cc/ ZM7Q-J5PC]; Ryan T. Anderson, The Continuing Threat to
Religious Liberty, HERITAGE FOUND. (Aug. 4, 2017), https://www.heritage.org/religiousliberty/commentary/the-continuing-threat-religious-liberty [https://perma.cc/5GG7-8HGY].
434. Maureen Groppe, First Year of Trump-Pence Brings Bountiful Blessings, Religious
Conservatives Say, USA TODAY (Jan. 19, 2018, 10:33 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/
news/politics/2018/01/19/first-year-trump-pence-brings-bountiful-blessings-religious-conserva
tives-say/1044308001/ [https://perma.cc/Y484-3UB5].
435. Id.
436. See Robert Pear, White House Acts to Roll Back Birth-Control Mandate for Religious
Employers, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/29/us/politics/birthcontrol-trump-obamacare-religion.html [https://perma.cc/JHT8-ZFPN].
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involving the religious employer.437 Under the Trump administration, HHS opened a new Conscience and Religious Freedom
Division, the Department of Justice (DOJ) instituted the Religious
Liberty Task Force, and the State Department held several global
conferences on combatting international religious freedom violations.438
During the COVID-19 shutdown, as some conservatives felt
embattled by state and local orders to close churches, church
closures became the new flash point in the religious liberty culture
wars.439 At the time the coronavirus outbreak affected the United
States, tribalization and political divides were so entrenched that
the virus was almost immediately politicized.440 And the lockdown
measures, once they affected churches, also became politicized
under the religious liberty aegis.441
President Trump stepped in, threatening to overrule states that
refused to open houses of worship.442 The DOJ entered the fray,
filing numerous statements of interest on behalf of churches suing
state and local authorities.443 U.S. Attorney General William Barr
437. 26 C.F.R. §§ 54.9185-2713 to -2713T (2022); 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2713A (2022); 45
C.F.R. §§ 147.131-147.133 (2022).
438. Meridith McGraw, Trump Administration Announces New “Conscience and Religious
Freedom” Division at HHS, ABC NEWS (Jan. 18, 2018, 11:19 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/Poli
tics/trump-administration-announce-conscience-religious-freedom-division-hhs/story?id=
52434480 [https://perma.cc/TX43-MTY8]; Sarah Hallam, Sessions Announces New “Religious
Liberty Task Force,” CNN (July 31, 2018, 2:46 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/30/politics/
jeff-sessions-religious-liberty-task-force/index.html [https://perma.cc/5YU9-57CN]; Ministerial
to Advance Religious Freedom, U.S. DEP’T STATE, https://2017-2021.state.gov/ministerial-toadvance-religious-freedom/index.html [https://perma.cc/JR7R-LXYE].
439. Jeremy W. Peters, Trump’s Approval Slips Where He Can’t Afford to Lose It: Among
Evangelicals, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/04/us/politics/
trump-polls-christians-evangelicals.html [https://perma.cc/9APT-8URK].
440. See Arielle Mitropoulos, For Red and Blue America, a Glaring Divide in COVID-19
Death Rates Persists 2 Years Later, ABC NEWS (Mar. 28, 2022, 6:32 AM), https://abcnews.go.
com/Health/red-blue-america-glaring-divide-covid-19-death/story?id=83649085 [https://perma.
cc/9AW8-3MHU].
441. See Colleen Long, Michael Balsamo & Emily Wagster Pettus, Justice Department
Takes Church’s Side in 1st Amendment Suit, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 14, 2020, 8:07 PM),
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory/justice-department-takes-churchs-side-1st-amend
ment-suit-70149557 [https://perma.cc/E4E7-RN4E].
442. Kevin Breuninger & Noah Higgins-Dunn, Trump Slams Governors, Demands They
Open Houses of Worship “Right Now,” CNBC (May 22, 2020, 4:19 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/
2020/05/22/trump-slams-governors-demands-they-open-houses-of-worship-right-now.html
[https://perma.cc/6KU6-KN3E].
443. See Melissa Quinn, Justice Department Sides with Virginia Church in Dispute over
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put out a strong statement in defense of religion, noting that “in
recent years, an expanding government has made the Free Exercise
Clause more important than ever.”444 When the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) issued its first guidelines on reopening, Roger Severino, the head of HHS’s Division of Conscience
and Religious Freedom, lamented that the CDC treated churches as
especially “dangerous or worthy of scrutiny than comparable secular
behavior.”445 The guidelines were too prescriptive, he said, and that
violated religious rights: “Governments have a duty to instruct the
public on how to stay safe during this crisis and can absolutely do
so without dictating to people how they should worship God.”446
The idea throughout the Trump term and still today is that
religious liberty is under threat. The conservative Justices agree
with that sentiment. (In this regard, it is important to note that the
conservative, Catholic Justices are seen as allies to Evangelicals,
often reflecting the same concerns.)447 Justices Thomas and Alito
issued a statement in October 2020 that Obergefell was wrongly
decided and needs to be reconsidered because of its “ruinous
consequences for religious liberty.”448 They lamented that the
decision “enables courts and governments to brand religious
adherents who believe that marriage is between one man and one

State’s Lockdown Orders, CBS NEWS (May 4, 2020, 2:42 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/
virginia-lockdown-church-coronavirus-justice-department/ [https://perma.cc/SA6F-H2V6].
444. On Fire Christian Ctr., Inc. v. Fischer, 453 F. Supp. 3d 901, 907 (W.D. Ky. 2020).
445. Abby Goodnough & Maggie Haberman, White House Rejects C.D.C.’s Coronavirus
Reopening Plan, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/07/us/politics/
trump-cdc.html [https://perma.cc/Z2JS-J5KE]; All Things Considered, Roger Severino Discusses the HHS Division of Conscience and Religious Freedom, NPR (Jan. 18, 2018, 4:16 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2018/01/18/578956922/rep-vicky-hartzler-on-why-she-supports-the-hhsdivision-of-conscience-and-religi [https://perma.cc/NL4T-AMS8].
446. See Goodnough & Haberman, supra note 445.
447. Ronald Brownstein, How Conservative Catholics Became Supreme on GOP’s Court,
CNN (Sept. 27, 2020, 4:39 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/27/politics/conservative-catho
lics-gop-supreme-court/index.html [https://perma.cc/F2QS-E9PV] (“‘You have a situation
where the evangelicals have been outsourcing their judicial appointments to conservative
Catholics’... The ideological convergence is that conservative Catholics, including those in the
legal field, have displayed as much commitment to conservative social causes, particularly
banning abortion, as evangelical Christians.”).
448. Davis v. Ermold, 141 S. Ct. 3, 3, 4 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (quoting Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2639 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting)).
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woman as bigots, making their religious liberty concerns that much
easier to dismiss.”449
Conservative Justices of the Court also weighed in on threats to
religion when COVID-19 regulations closed houses of worship. On
November 25, 2020, the Court ruled in favor of the Roman Catholic
Diocese of Brooklyn and the Orthodox Jewish group Agudath Israel
in their case against New York Governor Andrew Cuomo’s limitations on houses of worship.450 Justice Gorsuch, in his concurring
opinion, wrote passionately about the value judgments he felt state
officials were making about religion:
The only explanation for treating religious places differently
seems to be a judgment that what happens there just isn’t as
“essential” as what happens in secular spaces.... Nor is the
problem an isolated one. In recent months, certain other
Governors have issued similar edicts. At the flick of a pen, they
have asserted the right to privilege restaurants, marijuana
dispensaries, and casinos over churches, mosques, and
temples.451

Meanwhile, Justice Alito had, just a week before the case reached
the Court, expressed a similarly impassioned position, noting at a
legal conference that the pandemic had ushered in “previously
unimaginable restrictions on individual liberty.”452 In a July 2022
449. See id. at 4.
450. Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 65-66 (2020).
451. Id. at 69 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
452. See Associated Press, Justice Alito Calls Covid Restrictions “Previously Unimaginable,” Cites Danger to Religious Freedom, NBC NEWS (Nov. 13, 2020, 6:58 AM), https://www.
nbcnews.com/politics/supremecourt/justice-alito-calls-covid-restrictions-previouslyunimagin
able-cites-danger-religious-n1247657 [https://perma.cc/5CM4-46Y7]. However, the concern
about individual liberty seemed relevant to religious liberty only; law professor Steve Vladeck
noted in an interview with Slate that the Court seems less concerned about Covid restrictions
as they affect prisoners:
Look, for example, at how aggressive the Supreme Court has been in pushing
back against state COVID restrictions insofar as they affect religious practice,
and how deferential they’ve been with regard to COVID restrictions as they
affect prisoners. It creates the perception that the court is playing favorites with
litigants and claims.
Mark Joseph Stern, The Supreme Court Broke Its Own Rules to Radically Redefine Religious
Liberty, SLATE (Apr. 12, 2021, 2:51 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2021/04/supremecourt-religious-liberty-covid-california.html [https://perma.cc/GH5V-DXTP].
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keynote address in Rome that was widely covered by American
media, Justice Alito again warned that “[r]eligious liberty is under
attack” and might not endure.453
c. Ameliorate Political Tribalism Broadly and
Around Religious Rights Specifically
Bell posited that another reason for the Brown decision was that
elite decisionmakers were concerned about civil disruption when
thousands of Black servicemen and women returned from fighting
for American democracy.454 The decisionmakers realized that these
men and women were unlikely to accept the old regime of servility
to whites.455 To quell possible domestic unrest, Brown signaled that
the U.S. government cared about the needs and interests of Black
people.456
Today, the potential for tremendous social unrest also looms
large, largely due to the country’s worsening polarization.457 Numerous scholars and experts have warned about the potential for
these divisions to lead to violent unrest (indeed, a few such events
have already occurred) and even secession.458
Divisions over religious liberty are a particularly prominent facet
of this polarization.459 The Justices of the Supreme Court— particularly the conservative Justices—are aware of the fight and have
tried to mediate through their opinions. When it comes to LGBTQ
453. Ariane de Vogue, Samuel Alito Mocks Foreign Critics of Repealing Roe v. Wade in
Rome Speech on Religious Liberty, CNN (July 29, 2022, 9:42 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2022/
07/28/politics/samuel-alito-religious-liberty-notre-dame-rome/index.html [https://perma.cc/78
AH-PDBW]; Kelsey Dallas, How the Green Bay Packers Helped Justice Samuel Alito Explain
Religious Liberty Law, DESERET NEWS (Aug. 1, 2022, 11:00 PM), https://www.deseret.com/
faith/2022/8/1/23286702/samuel-alito-speech-on-abortion-religious-freedom-sports-fandom-toexplain-religious-liberty-law [https://perma.cc/B2AU-N97M].
454. Delgado, supra note 178, at 42.
455. Id.
456. Id.
457. DAVID FRENCH, DIVIDED WE FALL: AMERICA’S SECESSION THREAT AND HOW TO RESTORE
OUR NATION 1-2 (2020).
458. Id.; Brian Michael Jenkins, Opinion, Politicians Face Violence and Threats from Voters—and Each Other. Are We Nearing a Civil War?, NBC NEWS: THINK: OPINIONS, ANALYSIS,
ESSAYS (Nov. 14, 2021, 5:35 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/politicians-face-viol
ence-threats-voters-each-other-are-we-nearing-ncna1283824 [https://perma.cc/P6PA-T4P2].
459. See FRENCH, supra note 457, at 1-2.
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rights, Justice Kennedy in Masterpiece emphasized that “gay
persons and gay couples cannot be treated as social outcasts or as
inferior in dignity and worth” but also said about the Christian
baker that “the customers’ rights to goods and services became a demand for him to exercise the right of his own personal expression for
their message, a message he could not express in a way consistent
with his religious beliefs.”460 No doubt understanding the broader
cultural framework, Justice Kennedy spoke about both parties’ concerns from a place of empathy rather than labeling one party
bigoted.461
Similarly, in Bostock v. Clayton County, Justice Gorsuch paved
the way for broad Title VII employment protections for LGBTQ
individuals, but made a point to note that “[w]e are also deeply
concerned with preserving the promise of the free exercise of religion enshrined in our Constitution; that guarantee lies at the heart
of our pluralistic society.”462 He also reiterated the RFRA’s status as
a “super statute,” explaining that it likely “might supersede Title
VII’s commands in appropriate cases.”463
And again in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, which involved a
Catholic foster agency’s refusal to certify same-sex couples as foster
care parents, Chief Justice Roberts shepherded a unanimous
opinion in favor of the Catholic entity.464 While the religious claimants in that case had asked the Court to overturn the Smith precedent, the majority declined to do so in favor of a narrower
ruling.465 As law professor Hugh Hewitt noted in the Washington
Post, Roberts probably wanted to overturn Smith, “but he knows
the value of 9 to 0 in terms of guiding officials of the country to a
common consensus about tolerance of religious diversity.”466
Tanvir is the Court’s foray into another facet of the cultural
battle, this one between conservative Christians and Muslims.
460. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1727-28 (2018).
461. See id.
462. 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1754 (2020).
463. Id.
464. 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1873-74, 1882 (2021).
465. Id. at 1876-77, 1882.
466. Hugh Hewitt, Opinion, Chief Justice Roberts Opts for Restraint, the Center and a
Cease-Fire, WASH. POST (June 18, 2021, 8:11 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/
2021/06/18/chief-justice-roberts-opts-restraint-center-cease-fire/ [https://perma.cc/QK97TNHZ].
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Finding for the Muslim men despite the purported national security
interests at stake not only bolstered legal protection for Christian
religious claims but also softened the public image that the
conservative Justices—and conservatives generally—protect religious liberty selectively and favor Christian claims over Muslim
ones.
d. Promote an American Brand Instructive to Other Countries
Bell theorized that the Court’s decision in Brown helped position
America as a post-World War II moral authority.467 Similarly, the
Court’s interest in international image management may be at play
in its Tanvir decision. After the September 11 attacks, the United
States has contributed significant capital to improving its image
with Muslim communities abroad.468 The programming has often
been part of the government’s Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)
initiatives, which in turn are premised on the idea that American
security depends on winning the “battle of ideas.”469 As the first-ever
U.S. Special Representative to Muslim Communities, Farah
Pandith has explained, her job meeting with Muslim communities
in Europe and the Middle East was “an essential element of CVE
strategy”; it was a way of winning support for the United States and
promoting its human rights values.470 In a similar vein, in 2006,
then U.S. Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public
Affairs Karen Hughes created a Civic Outreach program that sent
Muslim citizen ambassadors abroad to speak to Muslim communities about their (positive) experiences in America.471
In recent years, particularly in light of the Trump administration
singling out Muslims for special disfavor, that image has become

467. Bell, Jr., supra note 155, at 524-25.
468. Farah Pandith Speaks About Countering Violent Extremism in the Wake of Trump
Administration Travel Ban, BELFER CTR. FOR SCI. & INT’L AFFS. (Feb. 14, 2017), https://www.
belfercenter.org/publication/farah-pandith-speaks-about-countering-violent-extremism-waketrump-administration [https://perma.cc/4YQB-2DWH].
469. Id.
470. Id.
471. Heather Maher, Islam: Muslim-Americans to Improve U.S. Image Abroad, RADIO FREE
EUR./RADIO LIBERTY (June 16, 2006, 4:02 PM), https://www.rferl.org/a/1069230.html [https://
perma.cc/YU46-J484].
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complicated.472 The Trump travel ban continues to have concrete impact on the relationship between Muslims abroad and their friends
and relatives in the United States.473 Further, the politicized
religious liberty battle between conservative Christian and Muslim
interests has also added to the negative image.474 Tanvir helps
resolve some of that tension.475
Conservative Christians also often lament about the persecuted
status of Christian minorities in some Muslim-majority states.476
Protecting Muslims’ religious liberty in America helps promote
religious liberty values in the Muslim-majority states Christians are
concerned about.
e. Protect Religious Liberty in Times of Emergency
In Tanvir, FBI agents asked the three Muslim men to serve as
undercover spies in their Muslim communities.477 It was not the first
time Muslims had been asked to spy or been subject to surveillance. In 2002, the New York Police Department (NYPD), with help
from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), began a decade-long
program of covert surveillance that monitored a wide range of
Muslims without any probable cause or reasonable suspicion of illegal activity.478 Undercover officers visited local businesses, schools,
mosques, and nightclubs and engaged casually with the business
owners to get a sense of their religious and political views and
report them back to the NYPD.479 Using a secret unit called the
472. See Isa Gutierrez, “Psychological Trauma and Stress”: The Lasting Impact of the
“Muslim Ban,” NBC NEWS (Jan. 20, 2021, 8:56 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/asianamerica/psychological-trauma-stress-lasting-impact-muslim-ban-n1254789 [https://perma.cc/
3GC8-A7PR].
473. See id.
474. See supra notes 427-29 and accompanying text.
475. See supra Part IV.B.3.a.
476. CT Editors, CT’s 25 Most-Read Stories on the Persecuted Church, CHRISTIANITY TODAY
(Jan. 4, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.christianitytoday.com/news/2018/january/cts-25-mostread-stories-on-persecuted-church.html [https://perma.cc/NEP6-XKAQ].
477. Tanzin v. Tanvir, 141 S. Ct. 486, 489 (2020).
478. Matt Apuzzo & Adam Goldman, After Spying on Muslims, New York Police Agree to
Greater Oversight, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/06/nyregion/
nypd-spying-muslims-surveillance-lawsuit.html [https://perma.cc/M2UV-3KXA].
479. Id.; Matt Apuzzo, Adam Goldman, Eileen Sullivan and Chris Hawley of the Associated
Press, THE PULITZER PRIZES (2012), https://www.pulitzer.org/winners/matt-apuzzo-adam-
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Demographic Unit, the NYPD mounted surveillance cameras on
light poles aimed at mosques, which police officers controlled
remotely from their computers in order to collect the congregants’
license plate numbers and generate footage of everyone entering
and leaving the mosque.480 Over the course of the program, the
NYPD surveilled “at least 20 mosques, 14 restaurants, 11 retail
stores, two grade schools and two Muslim student organizations.”481
And, in the end, the broad surveillance failed to yield even a single
lead.482
In recent years, many conservative Christians have become
attuned to the experience of broad curtailment of religious liberty in
times of emergency.483 The conservative Justices recognized it
explicitly in the Court’s November 2020 decision in Roman Catholic
Diocese, where it noted that “even in a pandemic, the Constitution
cannot be put away and forgotten.”484 Justice Gorsuch, in his concurrence, emphasized the message: “Even if the Constitution has
taken a holiday during this pandemic, it cannot become a sabbatical.”485
The Court in Roman Catholic Diocese also acknowledged the
unique impact on religious minorities in times of exigency. In its
opinion, which addressed an application by the Orthodox Jewish
organization Agudath Israel, the Court noted there was evidence
that the COVID-19 regulations as applied to the Jewish group were
rooted in anti-religious animus.486 The dissent in the lower court had
written: “The day before issuing the order, the Governor said that
if the ‘ultra-Orthodox [Jewish] community’ would not agree to enforce the rules, ‘then we’ll close the institutions down.’”487 The
goldman-eileen-sullivan-and-chris-hawley [https://perma.cc/RZL8-K4CW].
480. Apuzzo & Goldman, supra note 478; First Amended Complaint ¶¶ 45-46, Hassan v.
City of New York, No. 12-3401, 2014 WL 654604 (D.N.J. Oct. 3, 2012).
481. Colin Moynihan, Last Suit Accusing N.Y.P.D. of Spying on Muslims is Settled, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/05/nyregion/last-suit-accusing-nypdof-spying-on-muslims-is-settled.html [https://perma.cc/KQ57-4ZUN].
482. First Amended Complaint, supra note 480, ¶ 2.
483. See, e.g., Long et al., supra note 441.
484. Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 68 (2020).
485. Id. at 70 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
486. Id. at 66 (majority opinion).
487. Agudath Israel of Am. v. Cuomo, 980 F.3d 222, 229 (2d Cir. 2020) (Park, Cir. J., dissenting) (per curium) (alteration in original) (quoting Video, Audio, Photos & Rush Transcript:
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Governor also admitted on national television that his policies
“target ... a couple of unique clusters, frankly, which are more
religious organizations, and that’s what we’re targeting.”488 And he
described the policy as a “fear[-]driven response” to his constituents
“anxiety.”489
An amicus brief in Roman Catholic Diocese detailed these incidents and also extended its analysis of the scapegoating to the way
other minorities have been treated by the government in times of
emergency.490 In particular, it discussed the post-September 11
scapegoating of the local Muslim community: “For a decade after the
attacks, Muslim religious and community organizations were singled out and subjected to mass surveillance initiatives by a secret
unit of the New York Police Department known as the ‘Demographic
Unit.’”491
Given the pandemic context in which the Tanvir decision was
issued, the conservative Justices were attuned to the need for
religious liberty protections in times that otherwise require great
deference to the government.492 Professor Cass Sunstein has gone so
far as calling Roman Catholic Diocese “anti-Korematsu”493 (referring
to Korematsu v. United States, where the Court upheld President
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s executive order authorizing the internment
of Japanese Americans in the aftermath of Imperial Japan’s attack
on Pearl Harbor494). Roman Catholic Diocese is anti-Korematsu
because, despite the “serious health effects of the pandemic” and the
need to defer to the “complex choices by elected officials,” the
Governor Cuomo Updates New Yorkers on State's Progress During COVID-19 Pandemic, OFF.
OF THE GOVERNOR (Oct. 5, 2020), https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/video-audio-photos-rushtranscript-governor-cuomo-updates-new-yorkers-states-progress-during-1 [https://perma.cc/
V3CM-MFYK]).
488. Governor Cuomo Is a Guest on CNN Newsroom with Poppy Harlow and Jim Sciutto,
OFF. OF THE GOVERNOR (Oct. 9, 2020), https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/audio-rush-tran
script-governor-cuomo-guest-cnn-newsroom-poppy-harlow-and-jim-sciutto [https://perma.cc/
5QV9-9KZP].
489. See Brief for Muslim Public Affairs Council et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Applicants at 3, Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63 (2020) (No. 20-A90).
490. Id. at 3-11.
491. Id. at 7-8.
492. See supra Part IV.B.2.c.
493. Cass R. Sunstein, Our Anti-Korematsu, 2021 AM. J.L. & EQUAL. 221.
494. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), overruled by Trump v. Hawaii, 138
S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018).
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opinion demonstrates strong “judicial solicitude for constitutional
rights” and a “judicial willingness to protect against discrimination,
even under emergency circumstances in which life is on the line.”495
Sunstein recognized that the conservative Justices took this major step because religion was involved:
[I]mportantly, the case involved the Free Exercise Clause, not
discrimination in general. Those with realist inclinations might
emphasize that within the current Supreme Court, some of the
Justices are greatly concerned about discrimination against
religious believers and religious institutions in particular and
are interested in moving constitutional law in directions that are
highly protective of their concerns. Indeed, realists might note
that an important division on the Court can be found precisely
there.
More crudely, the Justices who are conventionally described
as “conservative” tend to side with religious organizations and
to seek doctrinal changes in directions that would please them,
whereas the Justices conventionally described as “liberal” are
less likely to side with those organizations and are less likely to
seek such changes.496

And it was not just any religion that the conservatives were worried
about. Both the politicized religious liberty context and the impact
of COVID-19 restrictions on houses of worship created a context in
which the conservative Justices were alert to the needs of conservative Christians in times of emergency.497 The pandemic made the
plight of Muslims more relatable to conservatives generally and the
conservative Justices in particular.
Sudha Setty notes in National Security Interest Convergence that
the powerful majority is more likely to accede to unjust national
security measures if those measures do not limit the majority’s
rights and privileges.498 On the flip side, when those same
495. Sunstein, supra note 493, at 222.
496. Id. at 236.
497. See Robert Dunn, Opinion, Op-Ed: Supreme Court Decision on At-Home Worship Wisely Supported Religious Liberty, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2021), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/
story/2021-04-13/supreme-court-california-worship-covid-bible-study [https://perma.cc/E9EM9HJY].
498. Setty, supra note 266, at 223.
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government measures begin to affect majority groups, “opposition
tends to grow dramatically.”499 Tanvir offers an example of this
interest convergence in the area of religious liberty.
f. Contrasting Results in Trump v. Hawaii
While the government’s duty to protect national security was at
the center of the Trump administration’s argument in both Tanvir
and Hawaii, the conservative Justices—usually prone to deference
to the executive—chose to defer in Hawaii, but not in Tanvir.500 This
Article argues that this divergence can at least partly be attributed
to strong disincentives and weak incentives vis-à-vis the politicized
religious liberty landscape.
i. Strong Disincentives
Among the multiple and complex reasons the conservative Justices upheld the travel ban in Hawaii are two strong disincentives:
(1) conservatives’ ideological alignment with Trump, and (2) advancing legal arguments that could limit conservative Christians’
religious claims.
Ideological alignment with Trump. Commenting on why the
Hawaii decision failed to elicit disapproval from conservative religious liberty advocates,501 one Washington Post writer noted: “To
take a stand against the ‘Muslim ban’ is also a stand against
Trump, who remains popular among conservatives and white
evangelicals, and for the rights of foreign Muslims, who are often
vilified by conservative Christian activists.”502 The travel ban was

499. Id. at 224.
500. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
501. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
502. Tobin Grant & Sarah Pulliam Bailey, Why Some Religious-Freedom Groups Won’t
Take a Stand on the Travel Ban, WASH. POST (Apr. 25, 2018, 11:59 AM), https://www.washing
tonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2018/04/25/why-some-religious-freedom-groups-wont-takea-stand-on-the-travel-ban/ [https://perma.cc/CM4C-2UN6].
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one of the central promises of Trump’s 2016 campaign.503 His name
was in the case title. To oppose the travel ban was to oppose Trump.
Conservatives could not afford to oppose Trump so defiantly.
After all, this was the same Trump who became the premier defender of Christians’ rights.504 Even the first iteration of the travel
ban reflected that Christian favoritism by prioritizing refugee
claims from religious minorities in mostly Muslim-majority states.505
Not only were Trump’s core constituents not opposed to the ban,
their support for it grew over time. When the Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI) surveyed Americans’ approval of Executive
Order No. 13,769, the third and final iteration of the travel ban, it
found that the numbers of white Evangelicals supporting the ban
had increased from when then-candidate Trump first announced the
ban on the campaign trail.506 55 percent supported it during the
election, and 61 percent supported it when it was implemented.507
In contrast, Tanvir did not require an ideological dealignment
with Trump. Even though the Trump administration was arguing
against provision of money damages, Trump himself was invisible
in the case. He did not make any public statements regarding the
matter, his name was not in the title, and the case matter did not
directly connect with his campaign or policy agenda.
Legal arguments limited the scope of religious protections for
conservative Christian claims. Legal commentator Jeffrey Toobin
noted in the New Yorker that, in recent years, the conservative
Justices are essentially “reading the establishment clause out of the
Constitution, and turning almost every issue into a free-exercise
case.”508 (Recall that empirical findings have found exactly this
503. See Jenna Johnson, Donald Trump is Expanding His Muslim Ban, Not Rolling it Back,
WASH. POST (July 24, 2016, 10:55 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/
wp/2016/07/24/donald-trump-is-expanding-his-muslim-ban-not-rolling-it-back/ [https://perma.
cc/9BPE-Z2WC].
504. See supra notes 441-52 and accompanying text.
505. See Exec. Order No. 13,379 Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into
the United States, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,977 (Feb. 1, 2017).
506. Daniel Cox & Robert P. Jones, 47% of the Country Say Trump Has Violated the Constitution, but Few Support Impeachment, PUB. RELIGION RSCH. INST. (Feb. 24, 2017), https://
www.prri.org/research/poll-trump-impeachment-constitution-partisanship-muslim-ban/
[https://perma.cc/G4EQ-M7PU].
507. Id.
508. Jeffrey Toobin, The Supreme Court Is Quietly Changing the Status of Religion in
American Life, NEW YORKER (Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/
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trend among lower federal court judges.509) According to Toobin,
conservative lawyers are arguing, and the Court is accepting, a vast
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause.510 Under this interpretation, the Free Exercise Clause requires that religious believers be
exempt from obligations binding on all citizens (such as Phillips in
Masterpiece being exempt from the Colorado nondiscrimination
law).511 In other words, the conservative majority wants an expansive religious liberty jurisprudence, so that it can accommodate a
wide range of religious exercise, including conservative interests in
the culture wars.
In a politicized religious liberty context, if conservative Justices
are looking to expand the interpretation of the Free Exercise
Clause, liberals—including liberal lawyers—are seeking to restrict
it. This might be one reason why, in Hawaii, attorney Neal Katyal
challenged the travel ban without invoking the Free Exercise
Clause.512 One conservative lawyer called attention to this in The
Hill, where he noted that left-leaning lawyers “know strong free
exercise protections will protect traditional Christian beliefs.... So
they put all their eggs in an Establishment Clause basket—hoping
that by winning under the Establishment Clause, they can prevent
blatant discrimination against religious minorities without also
protecting traditional Christian beliefs.”513 Some liberal lawyers
have admitted to such a strategy. For example, with respect to the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (which provides strong free
exercise protection),514 one liberal lawyer explained that “bolstering
[RFRA] runs the risk of emboldening the conservatives who use it
to restrict LGBT rights.”515
the-supreme-court-is-quietly-changing-the-status-of-religion-in-american-life [https://perma.
cc/42RW-DQ7B].
509. See supra note 326 and accompanying text.
510. Toobin, supra note 508.
511. See id.
512. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
513. Luke Goodrich, Opinion, No Anti-Muslim Bias at Supreme Court: Constitution, Argued
Properly, Protects All Religions, THE HILL (Apr. 5, 2019, 2:30 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/
judiciary/437575-no-anti-muslim-bias-at-supreme-court-constitution-argued-properly-protects
[https://perma.cc/59UD-6QLC].
514. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
515. Stephanie Russell-Kraft, Activists Are Invoking Religious Freedom to Save Migrants’
Lives, NATION (Apr. 15, 2019), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/no-more-deathsmigrant-catholic-border/ [https://perma.cc/GY3X-ZKL4].
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With the Religion Clauses caught in this ideological tug-of-war,
Katyal’s decision to use the Establishment Clause and avoid the
Free Exercise Clause likely created strong disincentives for the
conservative Justices to rule in favor of the Muslim claimants.
ii. Weak Socio-Political Incentives
In addition to strong disincentives for ruling against the travel
ban, any socio-political incentives that could have moved the
conservative Justices were relatively weak. The political tribalism
the Justices appear interested in countering had not yet taken firm
hold. Also, the COVID-19 context had not yet presented the urgency
around religious freedom protections that came to animate the
conservative Justices.
Less entrenched political tribalism. Although the conservative
Justices no doubt understood that a ruling in favor of the travel ban
would enflame passions among those who opposed Trump, the
public narrative of conservative Justices favoring Christian claimants over Muslim ones had not yet taken hold. Hawaii was the first
major trigger of this narrative, particularly in its contrast with the
Masterpiece holding just three weeks prior.516 The February 2019
case involving the Muslim death row inmate further exacerbated
perceptions of unfair treatment,517 creating an increasingly rancorous dynamic for the Justices to address when Tanvir was decided
almost two years later.
Pre-COVID-19 context. Hawaii preceded the COVID-19 pandemic
by several years. Without the pandemic, there was no real-world
context in which Christians’ religious liberty interests in America
were threatened by a state of emergency. To use Sunstein’s phrase,
the COVID context was necessary for a conservative “anti-Korematsu” and without that context, the incentives to avoid deferring
to the government were weak at best.518
The foregoing differences between Hawaii and Tanvir help
explain the disparate results. They also shed light on the limitations
of religious liberty interest convergence, covered in Part V.
516. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C. R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1732 (2018).
517. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
518. See sources cited supra note 493 and accompanying text.
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C. Religious Liberty Interest Convergence as Political Strategy
Interest convergence theory has not just been used to explain
rights-protective cases; it has also been used to formulate strategies
for political coalition-building. However, when a religious minority
is so politically powerless that its interests can be ignored without
political repercussions for the majority, the majority is unlikely to
protect it.519 As such, the minority should wield some level of power
in order for the majority to enter into coalitions with it. Viable
coalition-building also requires that both parties recognize the
interests they have at stake and believe that there is a benefit to
allying with the other.520
While there are ideological hurdles to overcome,521 ChristianMuslim coalition-building around religious liberty satisfies these
preconditions. First, although Muslims constituted only 1 percent
of the U.S. population in 2015,522 their political cache is significant—
demonstrated in part by how the Christian-Muslim divide has become a fixture of the national culture war and the defense of
Muslims’ rights has become a core issue for the political Right.
Second, conservative Christians and Muslims, for their own
reasons, have vested interests in the broad interpretation of
religious liberty protections. Tanvir highlights multiple Christian
interests at stake in the protection of Muslims’ rights.523 And
Muslims have incentive to work with Christians on legal matters
pertaining to religious rights, if for no other reason than to better
appeal to conservative judges, including the 6-3 conservative
majority on the Court.
Third, while not all Christians and Muslims in America understand the potential for mutual benefit, many do. The Muslim think
tank Institute for Social Policy and Understanding has found that
49 percent of the America’s Muslims support coalition-building with

519. Setty, supra note 266, at 193.
520. Cashin, supra note 260, at 270.
521. See discussion infra Part V.
522. Besheer Mohamed, A New Estimate of the U.S. Muslim Population, PEW RSCH. CTR.
(Jan. 6, 2016), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/01/06/a-new-estimate-of-the-u-smuslim-population/ [https://perma.cc/7PFH-287Z].
523. See discussion supra Part IV.C.3.
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political conservatives on religious liberty issues.524 There is no
similar polling among conservative white Christians, but at least
one nationally prominent conservative religious liberty advocacy
group (with significant influence in conservative Christian circles)
encourages “religious liberty for all” and the bridging of the
Christian-Muslim religious liberty divide.525 Part IV.D. looks briefly
at the roots of such advocacy in the religious freedom tradition.
In addition, America’s continued racial and religious demographic shifts and cultural changes—that is, the shift away from
white Christian America—suggests that the conservative Christian
interests outlined in this Article will remain salient and thus continue to create openings for religious liberty interest convergence
with Muslims.526 In particular, white Protestants, as new demographic minorities in the United States, more obviously share interests with other non-Christian minorities. Law professor Thomas
Berg appealed to that shared plight in his Christianity Today piece,
4 Ways Muslims’ Religious Freedom Fight Now Sounds Familiar to
Evangelicals.527 He argued the pragmatic benefit of the Golden Rule:

524. Dalia Mogahed & Erum Ikramullah, American Muslim Poll 2020: Amid Pandemic and
Protest, INST. FOR POL’Y & UNDERSTANDING (Oct. 1, 2020), https://www.ispu.org/americanmuslim-poll-2020-amid-pandemic-and-protest/ [https://perma.cc/W3QL-PZKK].
525. BECKET, https://www.becketlaw.org [https://perma.cc/2T44-JVDF]. Becket Law represented Christian claimants in the majority of religious liberty cases in 2019-2020. Steven
K. Green, How the Supreme Court Found its Faith and Put “Religious Liberty” on a Winning
Streak, THE CONVERSATION (Apr. 13, 2021, 8:30 AM), https://theconversation.com/how-thesupreme-court-found-its-faith-and-put-religious-liberty-on-a-winning-streak-158509 [https://
perma.cc/4NDG-GAAN] (“Catholic Social Services and its counsel, Becket Fund for Religious
Liberty, believe that they have the wind at their back.... they could be right.”). For examples
of Becket’s support of Muslims’ rights, see Holt v. Hobbs, https://www.becketlaw.org/case/holt/
[https://perma.cc/UZ57-E8UT]; Montse Alvarado, Opinion, A Hijab on the House Floor: A
Beautiful American Sight, DAILY NEWS (Jan. 15, 2019, 6:30 PM), https://www.nydailynews.
com/opinion/ny-oped-a-hijab-on-the-house-floor-a-beautiful-american-sight-20190115-story.
html [https://perma.cc/4LM2-Y6F6].
526. Scholars have acknowledged the impact of racial demographic changes on the viability
of wins secured through interest convergence and noted that “Bell makes no attempt to
account for how or whether America’s growing racial complexity might alter the phenomenon
of racial fortuity he laments.” Cashin, supra note 260, at 272-73.
527. Thomas C. Berg, 4 Ways Muslims’ Religious Freedom Fight Now Sounds Familiar to
Evangelicals, CHRISTIANITY TODAY (Sept. 9, 2019), https://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2019/
september-web-only/muslims-religious-freedom-evangelicals-legal-fight.html [https://perma.
cc/LR6A-V8DZ].
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“American evangelicals aren’t persecuted like Christians abroad,
but they do face increasing religious-freedom challenges.”528
Importantly, there are society-wide benefits to such MuslimChristian coalition-building, as it has the potential to not only shore
up religious protections but also serve as a bulwark against political polarization more broadly. Political scientists have prescribed
cross-cutting coalitions, or unsorting, as a remedy for political polarization.529 Unsorting is about complicating how individuals group
themselves and others into opposing camps. It creates a “partisan
dealignment” and reveals “cross-cutting cleavages.”530 Religious
liberty interest convergence across the Muslim-Christian divide is
a form of unsorting.
D. Religious Liberty Interest Convergence as Constitutional
Justification
The influential conservative religious liberty advocacy groups
that encourage “religious liberty for all” often explain that if
Americans cede to government the power to selectively protect
religions that it likes (or views as politically expedient) and not
protect the ones it does not like, the government can use those
limits against any religion at any point.531 The idea is that believers
of both majority and minority faiths have the same interest in broad
religious freedom protections. That this argument is oft-repeated in
conservative circles distinguishes religious liberty interest convergence from racial interest convergence, which turns on elite whites
and marginalized racial minorities typically having different
interests.532
528. Id.
529. See MASON, supra note 22, at 17-18.
530. Id. at 139.
531. See, e.g., Michael Gryboski, Russell Moore Takes on Critics at SBC for Supporting
Religious Freedom for Muslims to Build Mosques, CHRISTIAN POST (June 16, 2016), https://
www.christianpost.com/news/erlcs-russell-moore-takes-heat-sbc-supporting-religious-freedommuslims-build-mosque.html [https://perma.cc/FXX4-W7ZZ] (“Brothers and sisters, when you
have a government that says ‘we can decide whether or not a house of worship can be
constructed based upon the theological beliefs of that house of worship,’ then there are going
to be Southern Baptist churches in San Francisco and New York and throughout this country
who are not going to be able to build.”).
532. See supra notes 161-71 and accompanying text.

160

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:083

The shared interest in robust religious protections in fact
undergirds the constitutional protection of religious freedom.
Political scientist Mark David Hall explains that in the Founding
Era, what drove support for religious freedom was, first, that it
allowed for religion to flourish, and second, that when religion
flourished, it benefited society in myriad ways.533 On the spiritual
front, a variety of Protestant denominations—for example, Quakers
like William Penn, Baptists like the minister Isaac Backus, and the
Presbyterians of Hanover County, Virginia—argued that to be a
true Christian, one had to come to the faith free from government
coercion.534
As for the practical reasons for religious liberty, a central benefit
was that it offered a pragmatic tool to deal with religious diversity.
Since its inception, America was home to diverse religious groups.535
Hall writes, “[f]rom an early date, even in Congregational New
England and the Anglican South, there were dissenters, and the
middle colonies were always a muddle.”536 A 1771 woodcut of New
York City features houses of worship “belonging to Presbyterians,
Anglicans, Dutch Calvinists, Moravians, Jews, Quakers, Anabaptists, Catholics, Methodists, and others.... This diversity forced civic
authorities to negotiate laws and policies encouraging different
groups to get along.”537 Religious liberty was one of those policies.538
Of course, despite the recognition that religious liberty for all is
a good idea, the history of religious freedom in America is checkered. In the past, members of various Protestant denominations,
African American and Native American religions, Catholics, and
Latter-day Saints were persecuted,539 and today, prominent conservatives actively push for limits on Muslims’ rights.540 But the
533. Mark David Hall, America’s Founders, Religious Liberty, and the Common Good, 15
U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 642, 642 (2019).
534. Id. at 651-53.
535. Id. at 650-51.
536. MARK DAVID HALL, DID AMERICA HAVE A CHRISTIAN FOUNDING? 124 (2019).
537. Id. at 124-25.
538. Id. at 125.
539. See Kenneth C. Davis, America’s True History of Religious Tolerance, SMITHSONIAN
MAG. (Oct. 2010), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/americas-true-history-of-religioustolerance-61312684/ [https://perma.cc/NA62-Y7B9].
540. See, e.g., Sarah Pulliam Bailey, Donald Trump Says He Would Consider Closing Down
Some Mosques in the U.S., WASH. POST (Oct. 21, 2015, 4:29 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.
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minority rights element of the tradition suggests that the religious
liberty interest convergence project is more likely to succeed than
the short-lived victories of racial interest convergence. Materialist
considerations as posited by interest convergence theory can help
bring to the fore the latent, protective aspect of the religious
freedom tradition. Part V considers additional reasons religious
liberty interest convergence might fare better than its racial
counterpart.
V. THE LIMITATIONS OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY INTEREST
CONVERGENCE
Part III.C listed three limitations of interest convergence:
(1) remedies are short lived, (2) interest convergence requires
concessions, and (3) ideology can outweigh interest. This Part
addresses each as it applies to religious liberty interest convergence.
A. Remedies Are Short Lived
Interest convergence theory is, at its core, pessimistic about
human nature and, as such, doubtful about long-term change. In
Bell’s view, because parties are acting merely based on self-interest,
any short-term win will backslide when the majority’s interest is no
longer at play.541
A related concern is the majority’s instrumentalization or tokenization of minorities to serve its interests. As noted earlier, the
Muslim win in Tanvir might help deter government officials from
enforcing nondiscrimination laws against Christians who do not
want to serve same-sex couples.542 To the extent one or more of the
conservative Justices was motivated to rule for the Muslim claimants for this reason, the claimants were mere instruments. Similarly, in the political context, ameliorating culture war rhetoric
around religious liberty by ruling for Muslims may ultimately be

com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2015/10/21/donald-trump-says-he-would-consider-closing-downsome-mosques-in-the-u-s/ [https://perma.cc/XAH7-JSQC].
541. See Bell, supra note 155, at 526-28.
542. See supra Part IV.B.3.a.
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about making Christians’ religious liberty claims more politically
palatable.
When self-interest is the primary motivator for the majority in its
rights-protective decisions, these obstacles are inevitable. However,
there is reason to believe that religious liberty interest convergence
(along with its benefits for minorities) has long-term viability at
least with respect to claims that the Christian majority sees itself
reflected in. As demonstrated in this Article, religious liberty today
is seen as a way of protecting white Christian America from the
impact of seismic demographic and cultural changes.543 America is
fast browning544 and experiencing tremendous religious diversification545—trends that, if they continue, will create the conditions for
interest convergence and an openness to coalition-build with
religious minorities.
B. Interest Convergence Requires Concessions
There are not many Muslim advocacy organizations in the United
States, but the few that exist and have a national platform have
generally taken public positions against conservative Christian
religious claims. These positions are based on Muslims’ interest
convergence with other marginalized minorities. For example, the
Muslim advocacy group, Muslim Advocates, filed an amicus brief at
the Supreme Court against Jack Phillips in Masterpiece; the brief
argued that if discrimination were permitted against gay individuals, religious minorities like Muslims would also face discrimination.546 Although religious liberty interest convergence does not
require Muslim advocacy groups to cease partnerships with LGBTQ
and other minority groups, it does require some level of concession
on religious liberty matters. Muslim groups would have to acquiesce
to conservative religious claims when those claims would facilitate
a jurisprudence that is broadly protective of religious liberty and
could serve Muslims’ interests. Tanvir’s appeal to Hobby Lobby is
543. See discussion supra Part I.A.
544. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
545. ROBERT P. JONES & DANIEL COX, AMERICA’S CHANGING RELIGIOUS IDENTITY 7 (2017).
546. Brief for 15 Faith and Civil Rights Organizations as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 3, 8, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018)
(No. 16-111).
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one example of that.547
C. Ideology Can Outweigh Interests
Ideological divergence—particularly in the context of politicized
religious liberty and deepening polarization—is the biggest obstacle
to Christian-Muslim religious liberty interest convergence.
A core issue is strong anti-Muslim attitudes among conservatives.
In 2009, political scientists Kerem Ozan Kalkan, Geoffrey Layman,
and Eric Uslaner noted that although “[p]rejudice toward most
minority groups has declined in recent decades ... Muslims are an
exception: they are viewed much less favorably than most other
religious and racial minorities.”548 The researchers also noted that
religious and racial outsiders are eventually accepted by the ingroup, but cultural outsiders—people who exhibit behaviors
different from the mainstream or who are thought to hold different
values—have a harder time being accepted.549
Kalkan, Layman, and Uslaner hypothesized and proved that a big
reason Muslims are not accepted is because they belong to both of
these “bands of others.”550 Muslims may be considered both racial
and religious outsiders and “behavioral” outsiders.551 About the latter, the researchers wrote that even though Muslims are “generally
... well integrated into American society,” they are also “disproportionately foreign born ... and their religious practices and teachings
are clearly ‘strange’ from the standpoint of the Judeo-Christian
tradition.”552
Other studies suggest that “strange” means more than just
“different.” For many Americans—and conservatives in particular—
Muslims are simultaneously “non-American (outsiders), antiAmerican (enemies), and un-American (others).”553 A 2016 Pew
547. See supra notes 397-406 and accompanying text.
548. Kerem Ozan Kalkan, Geoffrey C. Layman & Eric M. Uslaner, “Bands of Others”?
Attitudes Toward Muslims in Contemporary American Society, 71 J. POL. 847, 847 (2009).
549. Id. at 849.
550. Id. at 848.
551. Id. at 849.
552. Id. In identifying these factors of “otherness,” the study found that the 9/11 attacks
and fears about terrorism do not explain anti-Muslim attitudes in America. Id. at 855-56.
553. Ruth Braunstein, Muslims as Outsiders, Enemies, and Others: The 2016 Presidential
Election and the Politics of Religious Exclusion, AM. J. CULTURAL SOCIO. 355, 356 (2017).
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Research Center survey found that almost half of all U.S. adults
believed that some American Muslims are anti-American.554 An
August 2017 poll by the Annenberg Public Policy Center of the
University of Pennsylvania found that almost one in four Americans
did not know that under the U.S. Constitution, American Muslims
have the same rights as other American citizens.555 A 2017 Pew poll
found that half of U.S. adults believe that Islam does not have a
place in “mainstream American society,” and almost half (44
percent) thought that there is a “natural conflict between Islam and
democracy.”556 A 2015 poll by the Associated Press-NORC Center for
Public Affairs Research found that Americans favored protecting
religious liberty for Christians over other faith groups, ranking
Muslims as the least deserving of this right.557 Eighty-two percent
voiced support for protecting religious liberty for Christians, while
only 61 percent said the same for Muslims.558 Of these divisions,
Pew researchers wrote that “attitudes toward Muslims are tied to
politics, even after taking education, age and other demographic
factors into account,” and found that Democrats are more accepting
of Muslims than are Republicans.559
Contributing to these perceptions of Muslims as religious outsiders is what scholars have termed the “racialization” of Muslims.
There is a particular idea of what a Muslim looks like (generally,
brown-skinned), which makes Muslimness an immutable characteristic—more like race than a religion.560 And when the government, the media, and private citizens conflate Islam and terrorism
and view all Muslims as actual or potential terrorists, terrorism (or
a proclivity to violence) also becomes an immutable aspect of
Muslimness.561 As one writer notes, Muslims and Muslim-looking
554. Katayoun Kishi, Anti-Muslim Assaults Reach 9/11-Era Levels, FBI Data Show, PEW
RSCH. CTR. (Nov. 21, 2016), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/11/21/anti-muslimassaults-reach-911-era-levels-fbi-data-show/ [https://perma.cc/KR8K-39GP].
555. Americans Are Poorly Informed About Basic Constitutional Provisions, ANNENBERG
PUB. POL’Y CTR.(Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/americans-arepoorly-informed-about-basic-constitutional-provisions/ [https://perma.cc/R72R-PUBB].
556. PEW RSCH. CTR., supra note 36.
557. Zoll, supra note 37.
558. Id.
559. Sahgal & Mohamed, supra note 38.
560. See Ibrahim, supra note 291, at 123, 144.
561. Id. at 136-37, 142.
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people are “projected as the fictionalized ‘terrorist enemy’.... whose
violence, danger and disloyalty is innate such that it transcends
citizenship ... [t]hey are neither citizen nor alien, but rather belong
to this inherently evil world called ‘Islam.’”562
Stereotypes about Muslims as non-American, anti-American, and
un-American have been an obstacle for Christian groups in the past
when it comes to supporting Muslims’ religious freedom. Notably
absent from the amicus briefs filed in Tanvir was the Ethics and
Religious Liberty Commission (ERLC) of the Southern Baptist
Convention (SBC). In 2016, the ERLC received strong pushback
from SBC members when it filed a brief in support of the Islamic
Society of Basking Ridge, New Jersey.563 The Islamic Society was
fighting to build a new mosque, despite many years of resistance
from local residents, and when the ERLC got involved on behalf of
the mosque,564 SBC members called for ERLC’s then-President
Russell Moore to be fired.565 As one member explained, “I move that
all Southern Baptist officials or officers who support the rights of
Muslims to build Islamic mosques in the United States be immediately removed from their position within the Southern Baptist
Convention.”566
Moore’s predecessor, Richard Land, also faced fiery protest in
2010 when the ERLC joined a multi-faith coalition to protect Muslims’ right to build houses of worship; Land was forced to withdraw
mere months after ERLC joined the coalition.567 In his words, “While
many Southern Baptists share my deep commitment to religious
freedom and the right of Muslims to have places of worship, they
also feel that a Southern Baptist denominational leader filing suit
to allow individual mosques to be built is ‘a bridge too far.’”568

562. Id. at 142.
563. Gryboski, supra note 531.
564. Bob Allen, Mosque Backed by Baptists Wins in Lawsuit Settlement, BAPTIST NEWS
GLOB. (May 31, 2017), https://baptistnews.com/article/mosque-backed-baptists-wins-lawsuitsettlement/#.YPn8wS2cbUY [https://perma.cc/5HBQ-ENLA].
565. Gryboski, supra note 531.
566. Id.
567. Tobin Grant, Richard Land Leaves Interfaith Coalition on Mosques, CHRISTIANITY
TODAY (Jan. 25, 2011, 10:18 AM), https://www.christianitytoday.com/news/2011/January/
richard-land-leaves-interfaith-coalition-on-mosques.html [https://perma.cc/F2AV-YKJK].
568. Id.

166

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:083

Clearly, there is a deep distrust, even hatred, toward Muslims
among many conservative Christians, and many stubbornly resist
Muslims’ rights. Making the situation even worse is conservatives’
tendency to conflate Muslims with the political left.569 This same
dynamic comes into play when political figures like former-President Trump position themselves against Muslims and allegiance to
Trump becomes conflated with opposition to Muslims.570 In a polarized context, such divisions can be intractable.
CONCLUSION
In many ways, religious liberty has fallen victim to the broader
phenomenon of extreme political tribalism taking hold in America
today. White, conservative Christians and religious minorities, especially Muslims, often find themselves pitted against each other in
the legal and political arenas—in sharp contrast to the bipartisan
coalition that passed the RFRA as recently as 1993.571
Charting a path forward requires a realist take on human nature.
Interest convergence theory is that realist strategy; it is a recognition that, although altruism is possible, for society-wide change,
something more is needed.572 Bell’s materialist school of thought
posits that humans with power will cede some of that power only if
there is something in it for them.573
Although this may be a pessimistic take on human nature,
interest convergence theory also offers hopeful possibilities—
possibilities of unlikely partners working together. Importantly,
religious liberty interest convergence does not require the involved
parties to agree on the substance of each other’s claims for them to
work together to achieve robust legal protections. Social scientists
refer to this as “tolerance,” that is, the process by which individuals
put up with others’ beliefs and practices not because they agree with
them, but because they seek a higher goal—in this case, religious
liberty.574 This type of tolerance is the reason at least one nationally
569.
570.
571.
572.
573.
574.
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influential conservative religious liberty advocacy group encourages consistency across Christian and minority religious claims.575
At the core of its advocacy is the idea that each side can endure the
other side’s practices and beliefs, even as they continue to vehemently disapprove of them.576
In a context when religious polarization is deepening and solutions are hard to imagine, religious liberty interest convergence
might offer a rare, viable solution.

Prejudice-Reduction: Two Ways of Improving Intergroup Relations, 50 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCH.
239, 240 (2020).
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